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The author wishes to thank Kathryne A. O'Grady and Suellyn Scamecchia, whose earlier
versions of this chapter were enormously helpful in this rewrite.
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§22.60
4. Supplemental Petitions to Tetminate-Failure to Rehabilitate
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b. Procedural Requirements §22.62
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Authority To Tenninate When Parent Has Complied with but Not Benefited from Services §22.64
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2. Parent Hanned Child or Sibling §22.66
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5. Failure to Provide Proper Care or Custody §22.69
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I. In General §22.82
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5. Termination of Parental Rights §22.86

I. Overview
§22.1
Child protective proceedings are govemed by the Child Protection
Law (CPL), MCL 722.621 et seq.; the Juvenile Code, MCL 712A.l et seq.; and Subchapter 3 .900 of the Michigan Court Rules. Taken together these sources of authority
establish a comprehensive scheme for reporting cases of suspected abuse and neglect,
investigating those repmts, and responding with appropriate action.
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Although anyone who has information that a child needs the cou,i's protection
has standing to initiate a proceeding, MCL 712A. 11; People v Gates , 434 Mich 146,
452 lW2d 627, cert denied, 497 US 1004 (1990), a child protection case typically
begins when Children's Protective Services (CPS) files a petition with the court.
On receiving a report of suspected child maltreatment, CPS must conduct an
investigation and, depending on the findings of that investigation, take one of several
possible actions. Those actions range from simply closing the case without any further involvement to petitioning the family court for jurisdiction over the children.
[fa petition is filed, the court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to bring the child w ithin the court's jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b) of the Juvenile
Code. The primary provisions of that section address child abuse and neglect, including emotional abuse or neglect and educational neglect. If the court determines that
there is insufficient evidence to invoke the court's jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the petition. Jf the court finds there is a preponderance of the evidence that one of the
jurisdictional bases articulated in section 2(b) is made out, the court may take temporary custody of the child.
A petition may seek the tennination of parental rights at the initial dispositional
hearing. MCL 712A.19b(4). The court, however, may not terminate a parent's rights
unless the petition requests tern1ination. Department of Human Servs v Holm (In re
SLH), 277 Mich App 662, 747 NW2d 547, leave denied, 482 Mich 1007, 756 W2d
86 (2008). Although the majority of petitions filed seek only temporary custody of the
child, the CPL requires that, in certain circumstances, the Department of Human Services (DHS) must seek termination of parental rights at the initial disposi tional hear- ·
ing. MCL 722.638. These cases involve the most egregious forms of abuse or neglect
(e.g., torture, criminal sexual conduct involving penetration) or situations in which a
court has previously terminated the parent's rights in another child and the subsequent
child is at risk of maltreatment at the hands o f the parent.
More typically, the court will assert temporary jurisdiction over the child. When
it does so, the court must establish a treatment plan intended to assist the parents in
regaining custody of the child. The court must conduct periodic review hearings to
determine whether progress is being made by the parent and whether continued wardship of the child is warranted.
lfthe child remains in foster care, the court must conduct a permanency planning
hearing (PPH) one year after the original petition was filed and once a year after that
for as long as the child is a temporary ward of the court. At the PPH the court must
determine whether the agencies involved have made reasonable efforts to finalize the
permanency plan. The court has five basic options at this stage: (I) retl.lrn the child to
parental custody; (2) direct that a petition to terminate parenta l rights be filed; (3)
p lace the child in a legal guardianship that is intended to be permanent; (4) place the
child permanently with a relative who is willing to care for the child (with a continuing wardship); or (5) order some other, unspecified permanent resolution to the
child 's situation (when options 1-4 are unavailing for the child).
When a child cannot be reunified with her or his parent safely, the court ,vill generally be forced to consider terminating parental r ights. The court has authority toterminate parental rights if one of the statutory bases is established by clear and
convincing evidence. If a basis for termination is established, the cou11 must then
22-4
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determine whether entry of an order terminating parental rights would serve the
child's best interests. MCL 712A. I 9b(5). Jf the court finds both that there is a legal
basis for tenninating a parent's rights and that it wou ld be in the child's best interest to
do so, the court must enter an order terminating the parent's rights. id. ; Department of
Human Servs v Hansen (In re Hansen), 285 Mich App I 58, 774 NW2d 698, leave
granted, 485 Mich 940, 774 NW2d 322 (2009). The determination regarding the
child's best interests may be made based on the whole record of the case.
If the court terminates parenta l rights, it must conduct periodic posttermination
review hearings for as long as the chi ld remains a permanent ward of the cowt or a
ward of the Michigan Children's Institute ( 1CI), the state's adoption agency. The
purpose of such a hearing is for the court to monitor progress toward the achievement
of an appropriate permanency plan for the child, and the court must make findings
regarding whether reasonable efforts to that end have been made.
A dispositional order removing the child from the parental home or placing tl1e
chi Id under the court's temporary jurisdiction, an order tenninating parental rights,
and any final order may be appealed to the Iichigan Court of Appeals by right. MCR
3.993. All other appeals are by leave. Issues concerned with the assertion of temporary jurisdiction must be appealed directly and may not be raised after a supplemental
petition seeking termination of parental rights has been granted, because the court has
determined this to be a collateral attack. Adoption proceedings regarding the child
may not be finalize d while an appeal of the decision to terminate parental rights is
pending.

II. Family Court Practice
Regarding Juvenile Matters
§22.2
Pursuant to MCL 600.l02l(l)(e), the fami ly division of the circuit
court has exclusive jurisdiction over child protective proceedings. Most aspects of
child protection practice are covered by the CPL, MCL 722.621 et seq.; the Juvenile
Code, MCL 712A. I et seq .; and the court rules regard ing juveniles matters, MCR
3.901 et seq. However, there are a number of other statutes, both federal and state, of
which the practitioner should be aware.
At the tederal level, practitioners should be familiar with the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 USC 510 l et eq., which establishes a federal fund ing
scheme for child abuse prevention children 's protective services, and related programs. Titles IV-8, 42 USC 621 et seq ., and IV-E, 42 USC 670 et seq., of the Social
ecurity Act estab lish federal funding streams for chi ld abuse prevention, family
preservation, foster care, and adoption services. Whi le these funding statutes do not
typically apply directly to ind ividual child protection cases, this is not exclusively
true. Suter v Artist M, 503 U 347 ( 1992) (holding that " reasonable efforts" requirement in federal act does not grant individual right). In cases involving American
Indian children, the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (JCWA), 25 USC l 90 l et seq.,
applies and its requirements must be met in addition to the requirements of state law.
In some respects, the ICWA's requirements supersede Michigan law. In addition.
some provisions of the federal funding statures grant individually enforceable rights.
See 42 USC 674(d)(3) (granting individual 1ighr to sue for violation of the M ultiethnic Placement Act as amended by Interethnic Adoption Provisions).
22-5
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Other state statutes that are important to child protection practice include the
Children's Ombudsman's Act, MCL 722.92 1 et seq.; the Foster Care and Adoption
Services Act, MCL 722.951 et seq.; the Foster Care Review Board Act, MCL
722.131 et seq.; the foster care licensing provisions, MCL 722. l l Let seq.; the guardianship of minors provisions of the Estates and Protected Individual's Code, MCL
700.1101 et seq.; and the Subsidized Guardianship Assistance Act, MCL 722.871 et
seq. Each of these statutes may become important to the proceeding, depending on the
procedural posture of the case and the facts at issue.
Moreover, the Michigan Court Ru les play a crucia l role in how child protection
cases are handled. Pursuant to MCR 3.90l(A)(2), "[o]ther Michigan Court Rules
apply to juvenile cases in the family division of the circuit cornt only when this subchapter specifically provides.'' See, e.g., Family Independence Agency v Jones (In re
PAP), 247 Mich App 148, 640 NW2d 880 (2001) (summary judgment rule, MCR
2.116, does not apply to child protective proceedings). This is the obverse of the rule
that appl ies to most fami ly law proceedings. See generally MCR 3.20l(C) ("Except
as otherwise provided in this subchapter, practice and procedure in domestic relations
actions is governed by other applicable provisions of the Michigan Court Rules.").
Unlike most family law actions, the child is a party to a child protective proceeding,
MCR 3.903(A)(l 9){b), and is entitled to full and active participation in the proceeding through her or his lawyer- guardian ad !item (L-GAL), MCL 712A. l 7d. Cf In re
Clausen, 442 Mich 648, 685-691, 502 NW2d 649 (1993) (child lacks standing to
bring action under Child Custody Act).
Juvenile proceedings have evolved into a highly technical subspecialty of fam ily
law practice with an increasingly complex body of rules, statutes, and caselaw. Before
embarking on the representation of parties in child protection proceedings, the practitioner is well advised to carefully consider this body of law. Association with a more
experienced practitioner is also advised. In addition, the State Bar of Michigan's Children's Law Section, the Child Advocacy Law Clinic at the University of Michigan
Law School, or the Chance at Childhood Program at Michigan State University are
helpful sources of infonnation and collegial support for those new to child protecti on
practice.

III. Constitutional Issues
A. Constitutional Protection for Family Relationships
§22.3
Child protective proceedings by their nature involve the intrusion of
the state into the affairs of family life. As such, every child protective proceeding
implicates important constitutional rights of both the parent and the child.
Familial relationships have long been accorded constitutional protection. See,
e.g. , Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399 (1923). This unique relationship is an element of the liberty protected by the due process clause and enjoys the status of a fundamental constitutional right. See, e.g. , Tlw:e/ v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000); Stanley
v I/linois, 405 US 645 (1972); Department of Human Servs v Rood (In re Rood), 483
Mich 73, 763 NW2d 587 (2009); Reist v Bay County Circuit Judge , 396 Mich 326,
24 1 NW2d 55 (1976) .
TI1e rights at issue in a chi ld protective proceeding are the reciprocal rights of a
parent and her or his child to remain together as a family. The Michigan Supreme
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Court has observed that " [t)he interest of parent and child in their mutuaJ support and
society are of basic importance in our society and their relationship occupies a basic
position in this society 's hierarchy of values." Reist, 396 Mich at 341 - 342.

B. Substantive Due Process
§22.4
Generally, the state must accord a child 's parents a great deal of deference in making child-rearing decisions. See, e.g.. Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57
(2000). The state is not, however, without authority to intervene to protect its parens
patriae interest in a child's welfare.. Thus, in the child protection context, courts have
repeatedJy held that there is no substantive due process right to familial integrity.
Martin v Children s A id Soc y, 215 Mich App 88, 544 W2d 65 I ( 1996); Doe v Gettle, 97 Mich App 183,293 NW2d 760 (1980).

C. Procedu ral Due Process
1. In General
§22.5
T he law entitles parents and children to procedural due process in

detem1ining whether child maltreatment has occurred and whether termination of
parental rights is the appropriate response. If parental rights are tenninated using
proper procedures and standards of evidence, the parent's liberty interests no longer
include the right to care and custody of the child. In re La Flure, 48 Mich App 377,
386-387, 210 NW2d 482 (1973). However, the exact parameters of procedural due
process are unclear. Procedural due process requires that both parents and children be
afforded "fundamental fairness" when the state seeks to intervene into fam ily life. Id.
In analyzing due process issues, the court applies the three-pronged test of
Mathews v Eldridge, 424US319 (1976). First, the court must consider the nature of
the private interest at stake. Next, the court weighs the government's interest. Finally,
the court considers the risk that the chosen procedure will result in an erroneous decision. See, e.g., Department ofHuman Servs v Rood (In re Rood), 483 Mich 73 , 92-93 ,
763 NW2d 587 (2009); in re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 50 I NW2d 231 ( 1993).
As noted in §22.3, the interest of parent and child in the preservation of their relationship unencumbered by the state is substantial. Conversely, the state has an "urgent
interest" in the protection of children's welfare. Lassiter v Department of Soc Servs,
452 US 18, 26 (1981 ). In analyzing whether a particular procedure measures up to the
requirements of due process, the court will look al the particular procedure that is
challenged as well as other procedures in place to protect the parent and the chi ld
from an erroneous deprivation of their relationship. So, for example, in considering
whether the appointment of an attorney is ahvays necessary in a termination proceeding, the court looked to the facts that only a lim ited pool of individuals or entities
could petition lo tenninate parental rights, that the petition must state specifically
what factual basis underlies the request to terminate, and that the parent must be given
a period of time to file a written response. See id. at 28; see also Vasquez. 199 Mich at
48-49.
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Michigan courts have addressed several
specific procedural due process claims, at times reaching differing conclusions.
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2. Right to a Hearing
§22.6
Before the state may remove a child from parental custody and place
that chi ld in foster care, the parent is entitled to a hearing regarding her or his fitness.
Stanley v 1/finois, 405 US 645 ( 1972). This is true even if the custodial parent is a
father who, while he has a relationship with the children, has not legally established
paternity. id. But see Family independence Agency v Bowman (In re CR), 250 Mich
App 185, 646 W2d 506 (200 I) (once court asserted jurisdiction over child, it had
jurisdiction over parent who was not respondent in case). Before the court makes a
finding of parental unfitness, the court may not a sume that the parent's and the
child's interests diverge. Scmtosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 760 (1982); In re Clausen,
442 Mich 648 , 687, 502 NW2d 649 (1993 ) (parents' rights and child's rights come
into conflict "only when there is showing of parental unfitness").
3. Right to Counsel at Public Expense
§22.7
In Lassiter v Department of Soc Servs, 452 US 18, 3 1- 32 ( 1981 ), the

U.S. Supreme Court held that the state is not required as a matter of due process to
appoint counsel at public expense in every te1111ination of parental rights case. Rather,
this decision must be made case by case. However, the Michigan Supreme Court has
held that due process requires the appointment of counsel at public expense to pennit
a parent to prosecute an appeal of the termination of her or his parental rights. Reist v
Bay County Circuit Judge, 396 Mich 326, 241 NW2d 55 (1976). Under Michigan law,
the court must infom1 the parent at the preliminary heating that he or she is entitled to
the appointment of an attorney at public expense. Department ofHuman Servs v Rood
(In re Rood) , 483 Mich 73, 763 W2d 587 (2009). Both the Juvenile Code and the
applicable court rules require that the "respondent" be appointed an attorney at public
expense if he or she is unable to retain one. MCL 712A. t 7c(4); MCR 3.9 15(8). It
should be noted that a respondent is the "parent, guardian, legal custodian or nonparent adult who is alleged to have committed an offense against a child." MCR
3.903(C)( I 0). The terms 'guardian,'' "legal custodian," and "nonparent adult" are
terms of art. The term guardian is defined under MCR 3.903(A)(l I) as a person
appointed guardian of a child by a Michigan court pursuant to MCL 700.5204 or
.5205, by a court of another state under a comparable provision, or by parental or testamentary appointment as provided in MCL 700.5202, or a juvenile guardian. Ajuvenile guardian is defined in MCR 3.903(A)( 13). A legal custodian means either a
person with legal custody of the chi ld granted through a legal proceeding or an individual who has been granted a power of attorney pursuant to ICL 700.5103. MCR
3.903(A)( 14). The term nonparent adult is intended as a practical matter to include
the boyfriend or girlfriend of the child's parent, although the definition is broad
enough to encompass a host of others. See MCR 3.903(C)(6). A party becomes a
respondent entitled to appointed counsel when the petitioner identifies an act or om ission by that party that converts the party's status from that of a nonoffending party
into that of a respondent and thereby subjects that party to the termination of his or
her parental rights to the ch ild at issue. See Department of Human Servs v Williams
(In re Williams) , 286 Mich App 253 , _ NW2d _ (2009). Before accepting a plea
of admission or no contest, the court must inform the parent that he or she has the
right to counsel. Department of Human Servs v Holm (In re SLH) , 277 Mich App 662,
22-8
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747 NW2d 547. leave denied, 482 Mich 1007, 756 NW2d 86 (2008). Failure to do so
renders the parent's plea defective. Id.
The court's duty to appoint counsel is triggered by the parent's request that the
appo inhn ent be made. In re Half, 188 Mich App 217, 469 NW2d 56 ( 1991 ). Once the
parent requests an attorney be appointed, it is error Jor the court to fai l to do so and to
continue with proceedings. See, e.g., Department of Human Servs v Rood (In re
Rood), 483 Mich 73 , 763 NW2d 587 (2009). [n assessing whether a respondent is
indigent and entitled to appointed counsel, the court may not impute to the respondent
income earned by people who bear no legal responsibility to contribute to the respondent's legal expenses. Department of Human Servs v Williams (In re Wifliams), 286
Mich App 253, _
NW2d _
(2009). To continue representation by appointed
counsel, the parent must maintain a relationship with the attorney. However, in Family Independence Agency v Weaver (In re KMP), 244 Mich App 111 , 624 NW2d 472
(2000), in which the trial court removed counsel at a tenu ination hearing because the
client was not present, the court remanded for finding of fact regarding why the
attorney was removed, where the client had attended a hearing two months earlier.
The court does not violate a parent's rights by refusing to appoint appellate counsel based on an untimely request. Department of Soc Servs v Conley (In re ConleJ1,
216 Mich App 41, 549 NW2d 353 (1996) . Similarly, a parent's rights were not violated by the court's refusal to appoint new counsel midtrial. Because the right to counsel is personal, a parent lacks standing to raise ineffective assistance of counsel by the
child's attorney. Family Independence Agency v Pantaleon (In re EP), 234 Mich App
582, 595 NW2d 167 ( 1999), overruled in part on other ground by In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341,6 12 W2d 407 (2000).
4. Standard of Evidence at Termination
§22.8
When termination or parencal rights is requested, the petitioner must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is a legal basis for tennination.
Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982); see MCL 712A.19b(3); MCR 3.977.
Michigan law permits a party to fi le a petition and seek termination of parental
rights at the initial disposition. MCL 7 I 2A. l 9b( 4). lf such a petition is filed , the court
may terminate parental rights only if it finds that there is a legal basis to terminate
suppotted by clear and convincing legally admissible evidence. MCR 3.977(E). Similarly, if the children are made wards of the court based on one form of abuse or
neglect and a supplemental petition seeking termination on the basis of some changed
circumstance is filed, that new circumstance mu t be proved by clear and convincing
legally admi si ble evidence. MCR 3.977(F); see Family Independence Agency v Gilliam (In re Gilliam) , 241 Mich App 133 , 613 NW2d 748 (2000); In re Snyder, 223
Mich App 85, 566 N\V2d I 8 ( I997). However, if tennination is sought based on a
continuation of the same neglect or abu e that originally brought the child within the
court's jmisdiction, an order terminating parental rights may be based on any relevant
evidence. MCR 3.977(H)(2) (eff. May 1,2010).
TI1e fami ly court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider the tennination of
parental rights of a parent who is suspected of murdering the other parent, even if the
surviving parent has not been convicted of the crime. Detem1 ining criminality in the
absence of a criminal charge or conviction does not violate the parent's due process
22-9
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rights. Family Independence Agency v Unger (In re J\IJU) , 264 Mich App 270, 690
W2d 495 (2004 ). leave denied, 472 Mich 871, 692 NW2d 846 (2005).

5. Right to a Transcript at Public Expense
§22.9
Due process and equal protection entitle a parent to a transcript of proceedings provided at public expense if necessary to prosecute an appeal in a tennination of parental rights case. MLB v SLJ, 5 19 US 102 (1996); Reist v Bay County
Circuit Judge, 396 Mich 326, 241 W2d 55 ( 1976). However, the late need only
provide a record of " 'sufficient completeness to permit proper [appellate]
consideration ' " of the parent's claims. MLB, 519 US at 128.

6.

Right to Remain Silent
§22.10
In Baltimore City D ep 1 of Soc Servs v Bouknight, 493 US 549 (1990),
the court held that when a parent is the court-ordered custodian of a child in a protective proceeding, that parent may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to decline to produce t he c hi ld when ordered to do so by the court.
Similarly, Michigan courts have long held there is no Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent in a child protective proceeding. Department of Soc Servs v Stricklin,
148 Mich App 659, 384 NW2d 833 (1986).

7. Right to Confrontation
§22.11
The Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses does not
apply to child protective proceedings. In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108, 499 NW2d
752 (1993). The purpose of child protective proceedings, the court reasoned, is to protect the child and not to punish a perpetrator of a crime. Such proceedings are not
criminal, so the Sixth Amendment does not require a face-to-face confrontation.
8. Miscellaneous Due Process Rights
§22.12
Due process does not guarantee a parent an adjudication and a period
of temporary court wardship before the state moves to tem1inate parental rights. Family Independence Agency v Bowman (In re CR) , 250 Mich App 185, 646 W2d 506
(200 I). However, where a petition makes allegations against only one parent, the
other parent cannot stipulate to the court 's assertion of jurisdiction. Department of
Human Servs v Holm (In re SLH), 277 Mich App 662, 747 NW2d 547, leave denied,
482 Mich 1007, 756 NW2d 86 (2008) (where petition made allegations of sexual
abuse against children ' s fathe r and no allegations against children's mother, mother
cou ld not stipulate to jurisdiction of court; while mother was party, she was not
respondent). The fami ly court has authority to order the removal of a gravely ill
chi ld 's life support so long as adequate procedural due process is ensured. Family
Independence Agency v AMB (In re AMB) , 248 Mich App 144, 208- 2 13, 640 W2d
262 (200 I). A parent has a due process right to receive proper notice of a child protective proceeding. Id at 173.
The Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply in the dispositional pha e of a
child protection proceeding. The admission of and reliance on hearsay in the dispositional phase does not offend due process so long as the hearsay relied on meets the
22-10
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test of fairness. rel iability, and trustworthiness. In re Kantola, 139 Mich App 23,361
NW2d 20 (1984); In re Hinson, 135 Mich App 472,3 54 W2d 794 (1984).
The DI-IS or its contract agencies may not deliberately create the grounds for termination of parental rights. To do so violates the parents' rights. In re B, 279 Mich
App 12, 756 NW2d 234 (2008) (where state workers reported parents to federal
authorities, knowing parents would be deported and thereby virtually assuring termination of parental rights, agency vio lated parents' right to due process of law) .

IV. Reporting and Investigating
Suspected Child Maltreatment
A. Detlnitions
§22.13
Michigan's CPL defines child abuse as
harm or th reatened harm to a chi ld 's health or welfare that occ urs through nonacciden ta l physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitatio n, or maltreatment,
by a parent, a legal guardian, or any other person responsible fo r th e child's health or
welfare or by a teacher, a teacher's ai de, or a member of the clergy.

MCL 722 .622([). A "'chi ld ' means a person under 18 years of age." MCL
722.622(e). A" 'person responsible for the child 's health or welfare' means a parent,
legal guardian, person 18 years of age or older who resides for any length of time in
the same home in which the child resi des or .. . [a) nonparent adult." MCL
722.622(u). Sexual abuse is defined by reference to the criminal sexual conduct statutes and may involve sexual contact with or sexual penetration of a child. MCL
722.622(w). Similarly, sexual exploitation is defined as "allowing, permitting, or
encouraging a child to engage in prostitution, or allowing, permitting, encouraging or
engaging in the photographing, filming, or depicting of a child engaged in a listed
sex ual act as defined in ... MCL 750. l45c.'' MCL 722.622(x). The tenn maltrearment
is not defined in the CPL, although it is typically defined as encompassing cruel,
rough, or bad treatment. See American Heri1age Diclionmy of the English Language
(4th ed 2000); Blacks Law Dictiona,y 971 (7th ed 1999).
Child neglect is
harm or threatened ha1111 to a child's health or welfare by a parent, legal custodian, or
any other person res ponsible for a child's health or welfare that occurs through either
of the following:
(I) Negligent treannent, including the failu re to provide adequate food, clothing,
shel ter, or medical care.
(ii) Placing a c hi ld at an unreasonab le risk to the child's health or welfare by
fa il ure of the parent, legal guardian, or other person respo nsible for the c hild's health
or welfare to intervene to eliminate that risk when that person is able to do so and has,
or should have, knowledge of the risk.

MCL 722.622U).
A reoccurring problem in child protection practice is the role of unrelated persons
who reside with or have regu lar contact ,vith children in their fam ilial homes. For
example, a parent's live- in paramour is often the person responsible fo r the ham1 done
10 the child. See. e.g .. In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 528 W2d 799 ( 1995). The
legislature has sough t to address this problem by defining abuse and neglect in a way
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that encompasses these individuals by labeling them "nonparent adults." A nonparent
adult is
a person who is 18 years of age or olde r and who, regardless of the person's domicile,
meets al l oflhe fo llowing criteria in relatio n to a chi ld:
(I) Has substantial and regular contact with the child.
(ii) Has a close personal relationship with the- child's parent or with a person
responsible for the c hild 's health or welfare.
(iii) Is not the ch ild's parent or a person otherwise related to the child by blood
or affinity to the third degree.

MCL 722 .622(t). A nonparent ad ult may be named as the respondent in a petition.
MCR 3.903(C)(l 0). Moreover, a nonparent adult's harm of a child may provide a
basis for fami ly courtjurisdiction, MCL 712A.2(b)(2), and the termination of parental
rights . See, e.g. , MCL 7 L2 A . I 9b(3)(b)( iii).

B.

Reportin g
§22.14
Michigan law mandates that certain professionals (e.g., physicians,
social workers, teachers), report to CPS when they have "reasonable cause to suspect
child abuse or neglect." MCL 722.623(1 )(aHb). As of This legal duty is not an
unconstitutionally overbroad intrusion on a professional 's First Amendment right to
freedom of association. People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 432 NW2d 409
( I988). The CPL broadly abrogates most legally recognized privileges. MCL
722.631; In re Brock, 442 Mich 10 I, 119, 499 W2d 752 ( L993) ("The physic ianpatient privilege is a statutory creation in derogation of common law, and hence will
be narrowly construed ... . Exceptions to statutory privileges should be broadly construed.") For example, the psychologist-patient privilege is abrogated so that a psychologist must report suspected abuse or neglect.
Mandated reporters are only required to repott chi ld abuse, including sexual
abuse, when the suspected perpetrator is a parent, legal guardian, teacher, teacher's
aide, or other person responsible for the child's health and welfare. ln People v Beardsley, 263 Mich App 408,688 NW2d 304 (2004), the court held that defendant school
adm inistrators were not ob ligated to repott to CPS that they had reasonable cause to
suspect that sexual contact between a 12-year-old boy and a 13-year-old girl had
occurred at the school during school hours. The court reasoned that the incident did
not constitute a reportable incident of child abuse as that term is defined in MCL
722.622 because sexual abuse is defined as sexual contact or penetration "with a
chilct,·· implying that the other person involved in the contact or penetration is an
adul t responsible for the child 's welfare.
The reporting requirement was recently amended to include members of the
clergy. However, a member of the clergy must report on ly if he or she receives the
information regarding possible child abuse outside 'a confession or simi larly confidential communication." MCL 722.631. However, if the clergy member is acting in
any other capacity listed in MCL 722.623 (e.g., as a family counselor), he or she must
report suspected abuse or neglect. MCL 722 .631 .
ln addition to cases in which professionals must exercise their judgment regarding "reasonable cause," the CPL spec ifies two sets of facts that, as a matter of law,
give rise to reasonable cause for suspicion of abuse. The first set is the pregnancy of a
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child under 12 years or venereal disease in a child who is between the age of one
month and 12 years. MCL 722.623(8). The second is when a chi ld is born exposed to
either alcohol or a controlled substance that was not prescribed for a medical reason .
MCL 722.623a. On the other hand, the law excludes from the de fin ition of neglect a
parent's failure to procure med ical treatment for a child based on religious objections,
although the court has authority to order medical treatment even over the parent's
objection. MCL 722.634. Similarly, if a chi ld is surrendered pursuant to the Safe
Del ivery of ewborn Act, MCL 712.1 et seq. , as a matter of law the child has not
been neglected. MCL 722.628(16).
While some professiona ls must report suspected child abuse or neglect, any person may make such a report. MCL 722.624 .

C. Civil and Criminal Liability Regarding Reporting
§22.15
Anyone who in good faith reports potential chi ld abuse or neglect is
immune from civil liabi lity fo r doing so. !CL 722.625; Awkerman v Tri-County
Onhopedic Group, PC, 143 Mich App 722, 373 NW2d 204 (1985) . Similarly, one
who cooperates w ith a CPS investigation is entitled to immunity. Britton v Mills , 248
Mich App 244, 639 NW2d 261 (200 I ).
On the other hand , a person who is mandated to report and fails to do so i civilly
liable for the damages proximately caused by that failure . MCL 722 .633(1 ); Williams
v Coleman, 194 Mich App 606, 488 NW2d 464 ( 1992). Such a fail ure is a misdemeanor and may result in criminal charges. MCL 722.633(2); People v Cavaiani, 172
Mich App 706, 432 NW2d 409 ( 1988). Moreover, one who is mandated to report and
who fails to do so risks loss of his or her profess ional license. Becker-Witt v Board of
Examiners of Soc Workers , 25 6 Mich App 359, 663 NW2d 51 4 (2003).
Making an intentionally false report of suspected child maltreatment may be
prosecuted as a misdemeanor or a fe lony. See MCL 722.633(5). Similarly, one who
knowingly disseminates a CPS report is gu ilty of a crime. MCL 722.633(3). In at least
one case a Michigan attorney has been sued, albeit unsuccessfully, for "dissem inating" a protective services report when he attached the report to pleadings fil ed in a
related domestic relations matter. See Zimmerman v Owens, 22 1 Mich App 259, 561
NW2d 475 ( 1997).
D. The Department of Human Services' Response
J. In General
§22. 16
All DHS employees involved in investigating child abuse or child
neglect cases must be trained in their legal duti es to protect the state and federal constitutional and statutory rights of children and families from the initial contact of an
investigation through the time services are provided . MCL 722.628(17). On receipt of
a report of suspected abuse or neglect, the OHS must commence an investigation
within 24 hours. MCL 722.628( I). The purpose of its investigation is to determine
whether the child was in fac t abused or neglected . MCL 722.628(2). lfthe child who
is the subject of the investigation is not in the parent's physical custody (e.g. , the child
is at school), the CPS worker must notify the parent of the investigation unless doing
so would "endanger the child's health or welfare." MCL 722 .628( I).
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At the time a OHS investigator contacts an individual about whom a report of
child abuse has been made or contacts an individual responsible for the health and
welfare of a child who is the subject of a child abuse report, the investigator must
state his or her name, whom he or she is representing, and the specific complaints or
allegations made against that individual. MCL 722.628(2).
During the investigation, the CPS worker will interview the child if the child is
able to talk. The interview with the child must not take place in the presence of the
alleged perpetrator. MCL 722.628c. Contact with the child may take place in the
school setting; the law requires that school officials cooperate with the investigation.
MCL 722.628(8). Before meeting with the child, however, the CPS worker must meet
with a designated member of the school's staff to "review ... the department's responsibilities." MCL 722.628(9)(a).
After meeting ,vith the school personnel, the CPS worker may meet with the
child. In doing so, the CPS worker may not search the child 's body if that search
-.vould require the child to expose "his buttocks or genitalia or her breasts, buttocks, or
genitalia" unless the CPS worker bas previously obtained a court order to search these
parts of the child's body. MCL 722.628(10). If such a search is necessitated by the
allegations or other evidence, CPS should obtain either parental permission or a court
order for a medical assessment. Absent parental permission or a court order, neither a
CPS worker nor a police officer has the authority to authorize a medical evaluation of
the child for possible abuse. See, e.g. , Britton v Mills , 248 Mich App 244, 639 NW2d
26 1 (2001).

2. Access to Medical and Mental Health Records
§22.17
When conducting an investigation, CPS will frequently seek access to
confidential information. The CPL requires that "school[s] and other institution[s]"
cooperate with CPS when it is conducting a child maltreatment investigation. MCL
722.628(8). The attorney general has opined that CPS is entitled to such records.
OAG No 6976 (Mar 26, 1998) (access to community mental health records). Access
to friend of the court records is provided by court rule. MCR 3 .2 l 8(D). Similarly, the
friend of the court has access to CPS records pursuant to MCL 722.627(2)(t).
CPS will generally seek access to otherwise confidential records via releases of
information. But the CPL requires that CPS cooperate with the court and take the
steps necessary to prevent further harm to the child. MCL 722.628(2). So if a parent
refuses access to records CPS thinks necessary to its investigation, it may take legal
action to obtain any necessary infonnation.
There are two situations in which access to informatio n is controlled by st atute
when a release is not provided, and these procedures must be used before court action
is taken. When CPS seeks infonnation from records that are protected by the cottlidentiality provisions of the Michigan Public Health Code or the Michigan Mental
Health Code, the legislature has established a procedure for CPS to obtain that information. See MCL 330.1748a 333 . 16281. Pursuant to these provisions of law, CPS
must make a request of the holder of the records that demonstrates a 'compelling
need" for access. The holder must then examine its records and release to CPS any
information that pertains to the child abuse or neglect allegation. If CPS believes
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there is additional infonnation of importance to its investigation in those records, CPS
may seek a cou1t order for further access to the records.
Moreover, effective in April 2003 , regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Health [nsurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) may make
access to medical and mental health records more cumbersome. HIPAA seems to
broadly except from its application state action aimed at preventing and responding to
child maltreatment. ln relevant part, it provides, " othing in [42 USC 1320d et seq.]
shall be construed to invalidate or limit the authority, power, or procedures established under any law providing for the reporting of .. . child abuse ... or public health
investigation or intervention." 42 USC l320d-7(b); see also 45 CFR 164.512.
Because these regulations are new, it is not clear whether they will affect CPS's work
or how Michigan courts may handle such issues. Counsel should become familiar
with HIPAA and its regulations. 42 USC 1320d et seq.; 45 CFR 160. 10 l et seq.
3. Access to Substance Abuse Treatment Records
§22. 18
Access to substance abuse treatment records is carefully circumscribed
by federal statute and regulations. 42 USC 290dd-2; 42 CFR 2.1 et seq. However,
substance abuse treatment providers must report suspected child abuse or neglect. 42
CFR 2.12(c)(6). Once the report has been made, the provider may not share further
information with CPS unless the parent has signed a specialized release of information that states that such records are protected by federal law or the agency obtains a
court order to access the records. Id. If the parent refuses to sign the release, Michigan
courts have held that the state's interest in protecting the welfare of the chi ld out;veighs the parent's interests in preserving the confidentiality of the records . In re
Baby X, 97 Mich App 111, 293 NW2d 736 (1980). Therefore, such records will be
available to CPS and the court, although it will be necessary to obtain a court order if
the parent refuses to release the necessary records.
E. Joint Investigations
§22. 19
In any case in which CPS is inve tigating suspected child maltreatment, it may seek the assistance of law enforcement. MCL 722.628(2); see People v
Wood, 447 Mich 80, 523 NW2d 477 (1994); State of Michigan Governor's Task
Force on Children's Justice, A Model Child Abuse Protocol: Coordinated Investigative Team Approach, at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/gtfcj/F[A-Pub794Model_ Child_Abuse_protocol-Version l _ 179026_ 7 .pd[ In certain situations, Michigan law mandates a joint investigation by CPS and law enforcement. MCL
722.628(3). These cases include situations in which chi ld maltreatment is the suspected cause of a chi ld's death, MCL 722.628(3)(a); the chi ld is suspected of having
suffered sexual abuse or sexual exploitation, MCL 722 .628(3)(b); the child has been
exposed to or had contact with methamphetamine production, MCL 722 .628(3)(f); or
the abuse or neglect results in a "severe physical injury" that requires medical treatment or hospitalization, MCL 722.628(3)(c). A severe physical injwy means "an
injury to the child that requires medical treatment or hospitalization and that seriously
impairs the child's health or physical well-being." Id. Similarly, law enforcement
must be involved in a joint i11Vestigation when such involvement is necessary to protect the child, the CPS worker, or another person, MCL 722 .628(3)(d), or when the
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alleged perpetrator of the abuse is not a person responsible for the child, MCL
722.628(3)(e).
During a joint investigation, either CPS or law enforcement may take a "videorecorded statement'' from a child under 16 years of age regarding the alleged abuse or
neglect. MCL 712A. l7b(5). Such a videorecorded statement must be admitted in lieu
of the child's testimony at all stages of a child protective proceeding except the adjudication. Id. When such a statement is taken, it must state the date and time that it was
taken, the persons present in the room, and whether they were present for the entire
interview and show a nmning time clock. id.
The questioning should be full and complete and in accordance w.ith the forensic
interview protocol. If appropriate for the witness's developmental level, the questioning should include, but need not be limited to all of the following areas:
the time and date of the alleged offense or offenses
the location and area of the alleged offense or offenses
the relationship, if any, between the w itness and the respondent
the details of the offense or offenses
the names of other persons known to the witness who may have personal
knowledge of the offense or offenses
MCL 712A.17b(6).
When a joint investigation is undertaken, it must be conducted in accordance
with the county's joint investigation protocol. MCL 722.628(6). See generally A
Model Child Abuse Protocol. hldividuals have a broader array of rights during a
police investigation than during a CPS investigation. Evidence gathered during a joint
investigation may or may not be available lo the state for various proceedings. See
generally Ferguson v City of Charleston, 532 US 67 (2001).

F.

Forensic Interviewing
§22.20
Michigan's CPL requires each cmmty to establish a forensic interviewing protocol. MCL 722.628( 6). The State of Michigan has adopted a model protocol,
which serves as a template from which individual counties must develop their own
protocols. See State of Michigan, Governor's Task Force on Children's Justice and
Deparlment of Human Services, Forensic Interviewing Protocol (GTF Protocol), ai
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/DHS-PUB-0779 _ 211637 _7 .pdf. The purpose of the protocol is "to obtain a statement from a child, in a developmentally sensiti ve, unbiased, and truth-seeking manner, that will support accurate and fair decision
making in the criminal justice and child welfare syslems." id. at I. See generally
People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 662 W2d 12 (2003) (CPS worker who questioned
child in proper manner was allowed to testify in criminal proceeding to child's hearsay statements pursuant to residual hearsay exception).
G

Structured Decision Making
§22.21
Jn determining whether a child has been abused or neglected, Michigan uses a two-step decision-making process. Based on the findings of this two-step
process, the worker must classify the case as falling into one of five categories. MCL
722.628d. The category .into which the case falls prescribes the agency 's response.
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The first step in thi process is for the CPS worker to detennine what level of evidence exists regarding whether or not the child has been abused or neglected. If no
evidence of maltreatment is present, the case is categorized as a category V case and
the matter is closed. MCL 722.628d( I)(a). If there is some evidence of maltreatment,
the worker engages in the second step of the analysis, which is to conduct a risk
assessment. The risk assessment asks, What is the risk of future hann to the child?
The finding with regard to current abuse or neglect is combined with the risk of furure
harm to the child to form the basis for categorizing the case in one of four remaining
categories. MCL 722.628(12). The four remaining categories are described in MCL
722.628d(l )(b )---( e):
Category IV-community services recommended. The investigation determines that there is some but less than a preponderance of the evidence of abuse
or neglect, and the risk assessment indicates that there is a future risk of harm to
the child. In this case the OHS must assist the family to access community services, but the family 's participation is voluntary.
Category Ill- community services needed. There is a preponderance of evidence that abuse or neglect took place, and the risk assessment demonstrates a
low or moderate risk of fuh1re harm to the child. The DHS must assist the family in obtaining services that are commensurate with the risk to the child. However, if the family does not participate in the services or does not benefit from
the services, the DHS must consider reclassifying the case as a category II case.
Finally, it is important to note that in a category fil case, although the agency
has found that child maltreatment has taken place, the perpetrator of the abuse
or neglect is not listed on the central registry. See MCL 722.622(d).
Category n- child protective services required. The investigation results in a
finding that a preponderance of the evidence indicates maltreatment occu1Ted,
and the risk assessment results in a finding of high or intensive risk of future
ha1111 to the child. In this case the OHS must open a protective services case and
must provide services necessary to address the family's problems. The perpetrator of the maltreatment must be listed on the central registry.
Category I- court petition required. The investigation resu lts in a preponderance of the evidence that maltreatment occurred and that one of the following is
also true:
The harm to the child requires that a peti tion be filed with the court. See
MCL 722 .637- .638.
• The child is not safe in the home.
• The case was categorized as a category II case, and the family did not
cooperate with the required services.
There is a felony assault or child abuse in the first or second degree.
When a case is categorized as falling into category T, the DHS must petition the
court, open a CPS case, provide services to the chi ld and family, and list the
perpetrator on the central registry.
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V. Petitions
A.

Petition Requirement
§22.22
Absent exigent circumstances, a request to invoke the protective jurisdiction of the family court must be in writing. MCR 3.96l(A). Thus, a child protective proceeding is commenced when a petition is filed asking the court to assert
jurisdiction over the child. People v Gates, 434 Mich 146, 452 NW2d 627, cert
denied, 497 US 1004 ( 1990). The contents of the petition form the basis for any preliminary action by the court to protect the child. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 505
NW2d 834 (1993) . If the petition is inadequate to fonn a basis for jurisdiction under
MCL 712A.2(b), the court may not obtain jurisdiction by the consent of the parties. In
re Youmans, 156 Mich App 679,401 NW2d 905 ( 1986).
The court rules require that a petition include basic information regarding the
child and her or his parents (e.g., names, addresses) as well as " (t]he essential facts
that constitute an offense against the child," MCR 3.961(8)(3), and a citation to the
relevant provisions of the Michigan Juvenile Code, MCR 3.96l(B)(4). If the child is
or may be eligible for membership in an American Indian tribe, the petition must state
that. MCR 3.961(B)(5); see also In re !Elvf, 233 Mich App 438 , 592 NW2d 751
( 1999). The petition must include a specific prayer for relief if removal from the
familial home or termination of parental rights is requested. MCR 3.961(9)(6). If the
petition involves an Indian child, the petibon must specifically describe the active
efforts that have been provided to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and the
documentation, including attempts, to identify the child's tribe. MCR 3.961(B)(6)
(eff. May I , 20 I 0) . Otherwise, the petition may simply request that the court take
appropriate action regarding the child. Finally, the petition must indicate whether a
family court case involving the child "is or was pending." MCR 3.96I(B)(7).

B. Standing to File a Petition
§22.23
A petitioner is "the person or agency who requests the court to take
action" regarding a child. MCR 3.903(A)(22). Any person may approach the cowi
with infonnation indicating that a child may be in need of the court's protection. MCL
712A. l I( l ); see People v Gates, 434 Mich 146, 161,452 NW2d 627, cert denied, 497
US 1004 ( 1990). Thus, the prosecuting att orney, acting on behalf of the people of the
state of 1ichigan, has standing to fi le a petition even over the objections of the OHS.
in re Jagers, 224 Mich App 359, 568 NW2d 837 ( 1997). However, when the DHS has
filed a petition, the prosecuting attorney lacks standing to amend or supplement that
petition. In re Hill, 206 lich App 689, 522 NW2d 914 (1994). A parent who is the
custodial parent of a child has standing to seek tennination of the other parent's
rights. In re Huisman , 230 Mich App 372, 584 NW2d 349 (1998), overruled in part
on other grounds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 34 1, 612 NW2d 407 (2000). However,
when both parents seek to re lease parental rights to their child, essentially turning
their child over to the care of the state, they lack standillg to do so. in re Swope, 190
Mich App 478, 476 W2d 459 (1991).

C. Contents of the Petition
§22.24
There are two basic types of child protection petitions: initial and supplemental. When it is alleged the child has suffered particularly severe fonns of abuse
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or neglect, the OHS is statutorily mandated to file a petition. MCL 722.637-.638.
When the DHS determines that a child has been "severely physically injured [as
defined in 1CL 722.628(3)(c)], sexu ally abused, or allowed to be exposed to or have
contact with methamphetamine production," the agency must fi le a petition seeking
court jurisdiction of the child, MCL 722.63 7( 1), Lmless the agency determines that the
parent or legal guardian of the child " is not a suspected perpetrator of the abuse" and
the parent or legal guardian did not neglect the child, the parent or legal guardian bas
no historical record of a pattern of neglect or failure to protect, and the child is safe in
the parent's or legal guardian's home. MCL 722.637(2).
Any petition may seek termination of parental rights at the initial dispositional
hearing. MCL 712A.19b(4). See generally In re Huisman, 230 Mich App 372, 584
NW2d 349 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341,
612 NW2d 407 (2000). In certain factual circumstances, the agency must file a petition and must seek termination of parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing.
MCL 722.638 . The termination provisions of the Juvenile Code include parallel provisions permitting the family court to tem1inate parental rights under these conditions.
See MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)-(n). When a petition seeks the termination of parental
rights at the initial disposition, the petitioner must prove a basis to terminate by clear
and convincing legally admissible evidence. MCR 3.977(E).
The vast majority of child protective petitions seek temporary jurisdiction and
court involvement aimed at providing rehabilitative services to the parents and the
ch il d. See MCL 7 l 2A. l 8, . l 8f. Such a petition must be proved by a preponderance of
the legally admissible evidence. MCR 3.972(C)(I). If the court asserts jurisdiction
over the child, there is a period ofas much as one year during which the family is provided services to assist the parent to regain custody of her or his child. During this
time the statute requires that if the OHS "becomes aware of additional abuse or
neglect of a child who is under the j urisdiction of the court and if that abuse or neglect
is substantiated ... , the [department] shall file a supplemental petition with the court."
[CL 7 l 2A.l 9(1).
That supplemental petition may seek continued temporary jurisdiction and a finding that the additional abuse o r neglect in fact occurred or it may seek the tenn ination
of parental rights. For example, if a child is made a temporary ward of the court due to
parental substance abuse and neglect and, after the child is in foster care, she discloses
that she was physically abused while in the parent's care., the DI-IS would be required
to investigate the new aJlegation. If the allegation is substantiated and the physical
abuse involved only minor injuries, the agency would have to file a petition but could
seek continued temporary j risdiction. However, if the physical abuse involved serious injuries, the agency would seek the tennination of parental rights. If, in its supplemental petition, the agency seeks the tennination of parental rights, it must prove that
the new allegation of physical abuse provides a basis to terminate with clear and convincing legally admissible evidence. MCR 3.977(F)(l)(b); Family Independence
Agency v Gilliam (In re Gilliam) 241 Mich App 133 , 6 13 NW2d 748 (2000); In re
Snyder, 223 Mich App 85, 566 NW2d l 8 ( 1997).
If the court asserts temporary jurisdiction over the child and, after a period of
time, that c-hild' s parent fails to make substantial progress toward rehabilitation and
reunification, the agency may fi le a supplemental petition seeking the termination of
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parental rights. See MCL 7 I 2A. I 9b(l). The statutory basis for termination must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, but the rules of evidence do not apply, and
the court may consider any relevant and material evidence. MCR 3.977(G)(2) (MCR
3.977(H)(2) (eff. May J, 20 J 0)).

VI. Jurisdiction
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
§22.25
The family court's power to hear child protection proceedings is not
inherent but is derived from the Michigan Constitution and statutes. Mich Const 1963
art 6, §15; MCL 712A.2(b); see also Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 92 NW2d 604
(1958),overruledinpartonothergroundsbyfn re Hatcher, 441 Mich 880,491
NW2d 580 (1992) remanded, 443 Mich 426, 505 NW2d 834 (1993). The legislature
has vested exclusive jurisdiction over chi ld protective proceedings in the family division of circuit court. MCL 600.1021( l )(e). The court's subject matter jurisdiction is
triggered when "the proceeding is of a class that the court is authorized to adjudicate,
and the claim stated in the complaint is not clearly frivolous. " Hatche1; 443 Mich
426. In general, the Juvenile Code grants the family court subject matter jurisdiction
in protective proceedings when the parent fails to provide proper care, when the parent's home is an unfit place for the child to live, or when the parent has placed the
child in guardianship and failed to comply with reunification plans. MCL 712A.2(b).
The court does not have jurisdiction over unborn children. /11 re Di/trick Infant,
80 Mich App 219, 263 NW2d 37 (1977). Jurisdiction may not be conferred by the
consent of the parties. Hatche1; 443 Mich at 433. In a case in which the petition
alleged sexual abuse by the child's father, the mother's stipulation to the comt's assertion of jurisdiction was insufficient to confer jurisdiction. In re Bechard, 211 Mich
App l 55, 535 NW2d 220 ( 1995). See also Department ofHuman Sen,.s· v Holm ([n re
SLH) , 277 Mich App 662, 747 NW2d 547 leave denied, 482 Mich 1007, 756 NW2d
86 (2008), where the father was named as the perpetrator of sexual abuse and the nonrespondent mother's plea that he committed the acts of abuse was insufficient to properly invoke the court's jurisdiction. However, once the court properly asse1ts
jurisdiction over the ch.i ld, it has jurisdiction over "any adult" including the child's
other parent, even if that other parent was not alleged to have neglected or abused the
child. Family Independence Agency v Bowman (In re CR) , 250 Mich App 185, 646
W2d 506 (2001). But see Stanley v Illinois , 405 US 645 (1972) (parent is entitled to
hearing regarding fitness before court may order children removed from custody).
The court rules may not ex pand or limit the court's jurisdiction. ln re Prater, 189
Micb App 330, 333, 47 l NW2d 658 ( 1991) (citi ng In re A/bring, 160 Mich App 750,
408 NW2d 545 (1987)). A county 's fami ly cornt is a single court, so the termination
ofa parent's parental rights divests the court of jurisdiction over a child custody matter regarding that same child. Foster v Foster, 237 Mich App 259, 602 NW2d 610
(I 999). A j udge presiding over a juvenile matter has the authority to hear actions
under the Child Custody Act, MCL 600.1021(3), but must abide by the procedural
requirements particular to the Child Custody Act or to proceedings under the j uvenile
code. See MCR 3.205; Departmem qf Human Servs v Johnson (In re AP), 283 Mich
App 574, 770 NW2d 403 (2009). The family courts of different counties have concurrent jurisdiction. See MCR 3 .205(A) (if subsequent court has "separate jurisdictional
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grounds," waiver of original court's jurisdiction is not req uired) ; Krajewski v Krajewski, 420 Mich 729, 362 NW2d 230 (1985). When a petition is filed, the court must
ascertain at the preliminary hearing whether another corni has continuing jurisdiction
of the child. MCR 3 .965(8)(9) (eff. May I, 20 I 0). If another court does have continuing jurisdiction, that prior court must be notified of the subsequent action. MCR
3.205(8).
Regarding educational neglect under M CL 712A.2(b)(I), in Michigan A.ss ·n of
Intermediate Special Educ Adm 'rs v Deparlmenl of Soc Servs, 207 1ich App 491,
526 NW2d 36 (1994), the court upheld rulings of the state chi ld welfare agency (now
the DHS) that declined involvement in cases in whjch parents and school officials d isagree about educational programs. Such disagreements, the court held, do not constitute abuse or neglect under the Juvenile Code.
The precise meaning of the clause " without proper custody and guardianship" i.n
MCL 7 l 2A.2(b )( 1) has been the subject of considerable litigation. The early caselaw
held that a parent who placed her or his child with a relative who was able to provide
proper care for the child and did so was not neglectful. See In re Taurus F, 415 Mich
512,330 NW2d 33 ( 1982); in re Nelson, 190 M ich App 237,475 NW2d 448 (199 1);
In re Ward, 104 Mich App 354,304 NW2d 844 (l 98 l).
But t\vo developments in the law have called the precedential value of this line of
cases into que tion. First, the court itsel f has indicated that a parent's efforts to provide care of a child through relatives who were seemingly able to provide adequate
care did not defeat the court's neglect jurisdiction. In re Sysrma, l 97 Mich App 453,
495 NW2d 804 ( 1992). In a case in which the child's parent had executed a power of
attorney transferring parental authority to the child 's putative father or, alternatively,
the putative father's mother, the power of attorney was insufficient to defeat the
court's protective jurisdiction. In re Webster, 170 Mich App I 00, 427 NW2d 596
(1988).
Second, and more important, after Taurus F. Ward, and Nelson were decide~ the
legislature significantly changed the language of MCL 7 l 2A.2(b )(I). The earlier version of the statute did not define "without proper custody or guardianship." [n 1988,
the legislature defined this clause to mean that the child is placed with another person
" who is legally responsible .or the care and maintenance" of the child. Id. (emphasis
added). (Although Nelson was decided afte r the amendment, it was based on the statutory provision as it was written before the amendment.) Presumably, then, a parent's
act of merely placing the child with another person without also providing some fonn
o f legal authority does not defeat the court's chjld protection jurisdiction. See generally MCL 700.5204(2)(b) {permitting court to appoint guardian for minor i.n this situation).
When the court has appointed a plenary guardian for a child's parent, a presumption arises that the child is at a substantial risk of hann to her or his mental well-being
and is without proper custody or guardianship. Unrebutted, the. presumption will support a finding that the chi ld comes within the court's protective jurisdiction. In re
Middleton , I 98 Mich App 197, 497 W2d 214 ( I 993). A valid exercise of statutory
jurisdiction is establ ished by the contents of the petition after the court has found
probable cause to believe that the allegations in the petition are true. Hatclm; 443
Mich 426. A court hearing child protection cases should not assume jurisdiction until
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sufficient allegations are made in a petition. In re Youmans 156 Mich App 679, 401
NW2d 905 (1986); In re Adrianson, 105 Mich App 300,306 NW2d 487 (1981).
When a petition is filed pursuant to MCL 7 I 2A.2(b )(2), the petitioner need not
show that the parent's neglect of the child is culpable. In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24, 444
NW2d 789 (l 989) . Thus, in a case in which the neglect resulted from the mother's
incapacity after a car accident, the court' s as ertion of jurisdiction was proper. Id. The
lack of need to demonstrate cu lpability and the Juvenile Code's grant of jurisdictional
authority in cases in which a parent fails to intervene to eliminate a known risk to the
child combine in one of the more contentious areas of child protection practicedomestic violence and the failure of a victim to protect the children fro m harm. The
court has addressed the effect of domestic violence on the court's authority to assert
jurisdiction. In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 80, 451 NW2d 576 ( 1990) ("Evidence of
violence between parents in front of the children is certainly relevant to showing ...
that the home is an unfit place for the children by reason of criminality or depravity."); In re Parshall, 159 Mich App 683, 406 NW2d 913 (1987) (tennination of
rights is proper when parent pennits abusive environment to continue). See generalfy
Family Independence Agency v Sours (In re Sour:,), 459 Mich 624, 593 W2d 520
(1999) (discussing failure to comply with domestic violence component of treatment
plan as basis for termination of parental rights); Family Independence Agency v
Osborne (In re Osborne) , 459 Mich 360, 589 W2d 763 (1999).
Michigan 's DHS has established a best practices protocol that seeks to balance
the safety of the children with the rights of the nonabusive parent. PSM 711-5, available at http://\.vww.mfia.state.mi.us/olm web/ex/PSM/7 I 1-5 .pdf, click on "Chi ld
eglect" and see "Failure to Protect" at 4- 5.
The family court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider the termination of
parental rights of a parent who is suspected of murdering the other parent, even if the
surviving parent has not been convicted of the crime. Family Independence Agency v
Unger (In re MU), 264 Mich App 270, 690 NW2d 495 (2004), leave denied, 472
Mich 871, 692 NW2d 846 (2005). The inclusion of"criminali ty" within a home as a
basis for jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) is not synonymous with a criminal
conviction. Instead, the court acquires jurisdiction over the children when a preponderance of the evidence shows that the surviving parent engaged in criminal behavior
and that the behavior rendered the home or environment unfit. MU, 264 Mich App at
279-280.
The court may assert ju1isdiction over a child whose parent perpetrated abuse on
the child even if the parent was incarcerated for that act and does not have regular
contact ,vith the child, because the child is still at risk from the incarcerated parent.
Family Independence Agency v Plovie (In re Ramsey) , 229 Mich App 310, 581 W2d
291 (1998).
The court's assertion of jurisdiction may not be col laterally attacked. Hatchet;
443 Mich 426. Thus, if a party objects to the court's assertion of temporary jurisdiction, that party must not wait until after a subsequent tem1ination of parental rights
proceeding to appeal the court's initial assertion of jurisdiction. Id.
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B.

Personal Jurisdiction
l. In General
§22.26
To obtain personal jurisdiction, Michigan law requires that a summons
be served on a "respondent'' to a child protective proceeding. MCL 712A.12- .13;
MCR 3.920(B)(2)(b). For purposes of a petition seeking temporary jurisdiction of a
child, " 'respondent' means the parent, guardi an, legal custodian, or nonparent adult
wbo is alleged to have committed an offense against a child." MCR 3.903(C)(IO). If
the petition seeks the tenDination of parental rights, "respondent" means the child's
mother or legal father. MCR 3.977(B); see In re Foster, 226 Mich App 348, 573
W2d 324 ( 1997) (legal custodian lacks standing in tennination of parental rights
proceeding). A parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child who is not a respondent, that is, is not alleged to have banned the child, is only entitled to notice of the
proceedings. MCR 3.920(B)(2)(b); see MCR 3.920(C). A summons must be personally served. MCR 3.920(BX4). If personal service is "impracticable or cannot be
achieved," the court may order an alternative fonn of service. MC.R 3.920(B)(4)(b).
The decision regarding the use of an alternative fonn of service may be made ex parte
and may be based on either testimony or an affidavit. Id.
[n Family Independence Agency v Al-Murisi (In re SZ) , 262 Mich App 560, 686
NW2d 520 (2004), the court held that although MCR 3.920(B)(4)(b).provides for
substituted service on a parent in a child protective proceeding if the court finds, on
the basis of testimony or a motion and affidavit, that personal service is impracticable
or cannot be achieved, the controlling statute, MCL 712A. I 3, requires neither testimony nor a motion and affidavit. Because the issue of service is a jurisdictional one,
the court held that the statutory provision governs, and the trial court did not err in
relying on petitioner's motion and proofs of nonservice when it decided that personal
service was impracticable.
·Once the court has secured jurisdiction over the child based either on a plea, see
MCR 3.971, or an adjudication, the court may, in the dispositional phase of the proceeding, assert jurisdiction "against any adult." MCR 3.973(A) (emphasis added).
Compare Family Independence Agency v Bowman (fn re CR) , 250 Mich App 185,
646 NW2d 506 (200 I) ( court rules provide that, at disposition, court has jurisdiction
over any adult), with In re Prater, 189 Mich App 330, 471 W2d 658 (1991) (court
rules may not expand jurisdiction). An order regarding a person other than the child
who is the subject of the petition ''is not effective and binding" until that individual
has been provided notice or summoned and given the opportunity to be heard. MCL
7 l 2A.18(4).

2. Putative Fathers
§22.27
For purposes of a child protective proceeding, a father means one of
the following: (1) a man married to the mother at any time from conception to birth,
unless a court has detennined that the minor is not the issue of the marriage; (2) a man
v.rho legally adopts the minor; (3) a man who by an order of filiation or by a judgment
of paternity is judicially detennined to be the father of the minor; (4) a man j udicially
determined to have parental rights (e.g. , an "equitable parent," see Atkinson v Atkinson, 160 Mich App 601, 408 NW2d 516 (1987)); or (5) a man who has properly
acknowledged paternity pursuant to the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL
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722 . 1001 et seq.MCR 3.903(A)(7). If a child has a legal father, that child's alleged
putative father has no standing to participate in a child protective proceeding. Family
Independence Agency v Jefferson (fn re KH), 469 Mich 621, 677 W2d 800 (2004),
overruling in re Mo11tgome1y , 185 Mich App 341, 460 NW2d 610 (1990) . If the
chi ld's legal father is not the biological father and does not wish to participate in the
proceedings, the court may make a finding in the child protective proceeding that the
child was born out of wedlock. KH. Such a determLnation satisfies the Paternity Act
requirement that a prior determination be made that the child was born during a marriage but is not an issue of the marriage. MCL 722.71l (a); see Girard v Wagenmaker,
437 Mich 231 , 4 70 W2d 3 72 ( 199 1). In such a case, the parties may proceed under
the Paternity Act or under the Acknowledgment of Paternity Act to establish the putative father's paternity. KH. slip op at 18. Conversely, if the court tenninates the parental right of a legal father who is not the child's biological father, its act does not
constitute a finding that the child was "born out of wedlock" such that an alleged
putative father may pursue paternity under the Paternity Act. Family Independence
Agency v Heier (In re CAW), 469 Mich 192,665 NW2d 475 (2003).
Until the child s natura l fathe r has legally established his relationship to the chi ld
or meets the definition of a putative father, he is not entitled to notice or participation
in protective. proceedings. MCR 3.903(A)(24) (defining putative father as " a man
who is alleged to be the biological father of a child who has no father as defined in
MCR 3.903(A)(7)"); Family Independence Agency v Hosler (In re NEGPJ, 245 Mich
App 126, 626 1/2d 921 (2001 ); In re Gillespie, 197 Mich App 440, 496 NW2d 309
(1992).
If at any point in a child protective proceeding the court determines that a child
has no father as defined in MCR 3.903(A)(7), the comt may make efforts to identify
the child's putative father and to notify the putative fa ther of the proceedings. To do
so, the court must first take testimony on the identity of the father and then must provide the putative. father with notice, either by personal service if his whereabouts are
known or may be ascertained after diligent inqui1y or by publication if he cannot be
located. MCR 3.92 l(D)( I). The notice must include the chi ld's name, the name of the
child's mother, the date and place of the child's birth, the fac t that a petition has been
filed with the court, the time and place of the hearing, and a statement that the natural
father's failure to attend the hearing constitutes a denial of interest in the child and a
waiver of notice of all further proceedings. MCR 3.921 (D)(l )(a)-{d).
Once notice has been properly fulfilled, the court may make any one of the following findin gs: (l) thnt notice lrns been properly provided; (2) that the putative
father is the child's natural father and that he has 14 days to establish a legal relationship with the child (which may be extended for good cause); (3) that another reasonably identifiable man is the chi ld's father; or (4) that the natural father of the chi ld
cannot be determined. MCR 3.921 (D)(2). If after proper notification, the child's natural father fails to appear or ifhe appears but fails to establish a legal relationship with
the child pursuant to the court's order that he do so, the court may find that he waives
the right to all subsequent notice, including notice of termination proceedings. MCR
3.92 1(0)(3).
A putative father 's failure to timely establish his legal relationship with his child
and his conduct before establishing paternity may be considered in detennining
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whether to terminate his parental rights. Department of Human Servs v Davis (In re
Jordan) , 278 Mich App 1, 747 W2d 883 (2008) . .ln In re Jordan, the child 's father
did not comply wi th the court's order to establish his paternity of the child within 14
days . ln fact, he did not establish patern ity until shortly before a tennination of parental rights petition was filed. The court terminated his rights based in part on his conduct before he actually established paternity. The father appealed, arguing that it was
improper for the court to consider his actions before he established paternity because
he did not yet owe the child a legal duty. The court of appeals rejected this argument,
holding that his failure to establish paternity in a timely manner could be used as evidence of his failure to provide proper care and custody. "[T]he actions of a dilatory
father," the court concluded. " occurring before he gets around to perfecting paternity
may be used against him in termination proceedings." Id. at 30.

C. Notice Defects
§22.28
The notice provisions of the Juvenile Code in MCL 712A.12- .13 are
jurisdictional, and fai lure to provide proper notice renders a child protection proceeding void . Family Independence Agency v AMB (In re AMB), 248 Mich App 144, 173176, 640 W2d 262 (200 l); Family Independence Agency v Teny (In re Ten y}, 240
Mich App I4, 6 IO NW2d 563 (2000); In re Brown, 149 Mich App 529 386 NW2d
577 ( 1986). Statutory notice requ irem ents will be strictly construed. Family Independence Agency v Harris (In re Atkim,), 237 Mich App 249,602 W2d 594 (1999) (citing In re Kozak, 92 Mich App 579, 285 W2d 378 (1979)). However, it is not a
jurisdictional defect to fail to provide notice pursuant to the relevant court rule. In re
Mayfield, 198 Mich App 226, 497 W2d 578 (l 993).
In general, the fam ily court must personally serve a parent unless doing so is
found to be impractical after reasonable efforts have been made to locate and serve
the parent. In re Adair, 191 Mich App 710, 478 W2d 667 (199 1). Notice is a personal right, so a parent who is properly served lacks standing to object to the service
received by the other parent. Ter1 J1, 240 M ich App at 21 . Because notice is a personal
right, notice served on a party's attorney is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the
party. Atkins.
Ifa party ap pears at a hearing and properly waives notice in writing, the court has
satisfied the relevant notice re.quirements. In re Slis, 144 Mich App 678, 3 75 W2d
788 ( 1985); see MCR 3 .920(E). Unless a specific objection to tbe method of notice is
placed on the record, a parent waives any defects in service by appearing and participating in the proceeding. MCR 3.920(0). Those same amendments specifically provide for notice to incarcerated parents. See MCR 3.920(A)(2) (incorporating by
reference MCR 2.004).

VII. Venue
§22.29
The fam ily court has jurisdiction of a chi ld "found within the county"
who has suffered abuse or neglect. MCL 712A.2(b); In re Mathers, 37 1 Mich 516,
124 W2d 878 ( 1963 ). The " found within the county" language refers to the county
" in which the offense against the child occurred .. . or in which the minor is physically
present."MCR 3.926(A). Thus, for example, if a child is abused in county A and then
taken to a hospital in county B, either county is a proper ven ue. ln such a case the
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rules provide for the transfer of the case to the county where the child resides. MCR
3.926(8). The rules establish a set of crite1ia for determining which among competing
counties is the county of residence. See MCR 3.926(8)(2). If a child is placed in a
particular county by comt order, that county is not the child's county of residence
unless the placement is for the purposes of adoption. MCR 3.926(8)(3). See Anderson
v Schafe r (In re BZ), 264 Mich App 286, 690 NW2d 505 (2004) (where parents consented to out-of-home placement with paternal grandmother in Isabella County, MCR
3.926(8)(3) applied and directly contradicted parents' argument that child was not
"found within" Kent cotmty for jurisdictional purposes). Regardless of where the case
is heard, the county that orders a disposition is responsible for any costs that result
from that disposition. MCR 3.926(C).
A change of venue may be granted for the convenience of the parties or if a fair
trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending. MCR 3.926(0). The court
may bifurcate a proceeding, allowing the case to be tried in one county and then transferred immediatel y after adjudication to another county, where a disposition will be
entered. MCR 3.926(E). This process clearly violates the "one family, one judge" 1ule
articulated by the legislature. MCL 600. 1023. Because parents have assigned counsel
in the majority of child protection cases and a L-GAL must be appointed by the comt
to represent the child 's interests, MCL 722.630, transfer of a case after adjudication
but before disposition has very serious impl ications for continuity of and effective
representation. See Family Independence Agency v A}JB (In re AME}, 248 Mich App
144, 225, 640 NW2d 262 (2001} ("[T]he right to an attorney would be meaningless if
a minor child who is the subject of a proceeding that can change ... her life could not
expect that the attorney representing her will do so effectively."}; In re Shaffer, 213
Mich App 429, 540 NW2d 706 ( I 995) ( child is entitled to zealous advocacy). See
generally MCR 2.630 (requiring single judge in civil proceeding unless death, illness,
or disability prevents that judge from presiding). Transfer should take place before
rather than after adjudication.

VIII. Protective Custody and
Preliminary Inquiries and Hearings
A. Protective Custody
§22.30
Michigan law permits a law enforcement officer to take a child into
protective custody without a court order at any time if the officer determines that the
child's "surroundings are such as to endanger his or her health, morals, or welfare."
MCL 7 l 2A.14(l ); MCR 3.963(A). The officer must immediately attempt to notify the
child's parents or legal custodian . MCL 712A.14(1). Similarly, MCL 722.626(1) permits a hospital to detain a child whose welfare would be endangered by release. See,
e.g . in re A/bring, 160 Mich App 750,408 NW2d 545 (1987).
If sufficient proofs establish reasonable grounds to believe that a child's conditions or surroundings merit such action, the court may issue a written order pennitting
"a child protective services worker, an officer, or other person deemed suitable by the
comt" to take the child into protective custody pending a hearing. MCR 3.963(B)( I);
see MCL 712A.15; A/bring The United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan has he ld that the Fourth Amendment was violated when CPS workers
and police officers entered a private home to remove children based only on a verbal
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authorization of a family court referee. See O'Donnell v Brown, 335 F Supp 2d 787
(WD Mich 2004).
Protective custody orders may include an order to enter a "specified pre.mises" to
secure custody of that child. MCR 3.963(B)(l). If the court enters a written order to
take the child into custody, it must also make a finding that reasonable efforts to prevent the removal have been made. id. An order removing a child from the parental
home must state that the court has found that continued placement ,vith the parent is
contrary to the child 's welfare and must detail the basis for that determination . MCR
3.963(8)(2).
A child taken into custody because of alleged maltreatment may not be housed in
a secure facility intended to hold children alleged to have committed delinquent acts .
MCL 7l2A. 15(4).

B.

Preliminary lnquiries
§22.31
When a petition presented to the court does not seek the child's
removal from the physical custody of the parent or legal guardian , "the court may
conduct a preliminary inquily to detennine the appropriate action to be taken on the
petition."MCR 3.962(A) (emphasis added). A preliminary inquiry "consists of an
informal review of the petition by the juvenile court to determine the appropriate
course of action." in re Ha1cher, 443 Mich 426, 434, 505 NW2d 834 ( 1993). See generally In re Bechard, 211 Mich App 155, 535 W2d 220 ( 1995). At such an inquiry,
the court may (I) deny authorization of the petition, (2) refer the case to receive alternative services, or (3) authorize the fi ling of the petition with the court. MCR
3.962(B). In a peremptory order, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that where a
petition filed by the DHS sought only a court-ordered medical examination and did
not seek removal of the child from the home or other relief, the trial court erred by
ordering the medical evaluation . Department ofHuman Servs v Kyle (in re Kyle) , 480
Mich 1151 , 746 NW2d 302 (2008). " Referring the matter to 'alternative services'
does not include granting the only relief sought by the petition." The preliminary
inquiry rule does not provide the family court with the authority to grant the only
relief requested in the peti tion without a trial. id. Preliminary inquiries do not require
the cou11 to hold any form of hearing and, in some counties, these inquiries take place
ex parte with no verbatim record of the court's action.
C. Preliminary Hearings
§22.32
A prel iminary hearing is a fo nnal review of a petition. In re Hatcher,
443 Mich 426, 434, 505 NW2d 834 (1993). A preliminary hearing must be held
within 24 hours after a child is taken into protective custody or within 24 hours after
the submission of a petition alleg ing severe physical injury or sexual abuse when the
child has not been taken into protective custody. MCR 3.965(A). When the petition
does not allege severe physical or sexual abuse and the child has not been taken into
protective custody, the preliminary hearing may be scheduled as the court's docket
permits, although it should be scheduled as soon as possible.
There are a number of specific procedural requirements for the preliminary hearing. MCR 3 .96S(B). While most preliminary hearings are conducted with the parties
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in the courtroom, ifCR 3.904 authorizes the use of two-way interactive video to facilitate preliminary hearings.
The court must appoint an L-GAL to represent a child at the preliminary hearing.
MCL 712A.17c(7), 722.630; MCR 3.965(B)(3}(eff. May I, 2010). The L-GALmust
receive a copy of the petition at the preliminary hearing. Id. Th~ child may not waive
representation by the L-GAL. MCL 7 l2A.l 7c(7).
Similarly, the court must inform the respondent of the right to counsel. MCL
712A.17c(4); MCR 3.915(B)(I)(a), .965(B)(6) (eff. May 1, 2010); Department of
Human Servs v Rood (In re Rood), 483 Mich 73, 763 NW2d 587 (2009) (where
mother requested appointment of counsel at preliminary hearing and court failed to
appoint counsel unti l two weeks before hearing on supplemental petition to terminate
parental rights, court's failure was error requiring reversal of order tenninating parental rights). Unless the respondent is a m inor, he or she may waive counsel. MCL
712A. l 7c(6). A minor respondent may not waive counsel if the minor respondent's
parent or guardian ad !item objects. Id.
A procedural requirement of the preliminary hearing that is often overlooked, but
that is critical, is the determination of the child's Native Ame1ican heritage, and
whether the l.ndian Child Welfare Act may apply to the case. The court must inquire
whether the child or the parent is a member of or eligible for membership in an American Indian tribe or band. MCR 3.965(B)(2); see generally Family Independence
Agency v Cons elyea (In re T1vl) , 245 Mich App I 81 , 628 NW2d 570 {200 l ); In re
/EM, 233 Mich App 438, 592 NW2d 75 1 ( 1999). For more i11formation about the
effect of LCWA on child protective proceedings, see §§22.80-22.86.
In essence, the court must answer two questions at a preliminary hearing. First,
the colllt must determine whether to authorize the petition for filing . MCR
3 .965(8)(1 l). If it does, it must determine whether to place the children outside the
familial home . MCR 3.965(8)( 11) and (C).
The court may authorize the petition for tiling if, after the preliminary hearing,
the court detennines that there is probable cause to believe ( I) that one or more of the
allegations in the petition is true and (2) those allegations, if proven, would bring the
child wi thin the court's protective jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 7 12A.2. MCR
3.965(8)(11). The Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply to this determination,
and the court may consider any relevant evidence. Id. A petition is "authorized to be
filed" when the petitioner has received the court's written pennission to file the petition formally alleging chi ld maltreatment. MCR 3 .903(A)(2 l ).
ff the court authorizes the petition. it must then detennine the child's placement.
MCR 3.965(8)(11 ), (12), (C), and (D). The standard for placement at the preliminary
hearing is whether the child's continued placement with the parent wou ld be "contrary lo the welfare of the child." MCR 3.965(C)(2). Whatever decision the court
makes regarding the chi ld's placement, it must detail its reasons for the finding either
on the record or in writing. MCR 3.965(C)(3). The law presumes that a child should
be placed in the most family-like setting that will meet her or his needs . MCL
7l 2A.1 (3); MCR 3.965(C)(2). Thu , on authorizing a petition, the court may release a
child to a parent, guardian, or legal custodian. MCR 3.965(8)(12)(a). If the court does
so, it "may order such reasonable tenns and conditions" as are necessary to safeguard
the child's welfare. Id
22-28

10 Supp.

Child Pro/ection Lmv and.Procedure

§22.32

Alternatively, the court may place the child outside the custody of the parent,
guardian, or legal custodian. MCR 3. 965(C). Again, whatever detennination the court
makes, it must articulate its reasons for the decision on the record or in writing. MCR
3.965(C)(3). rf the court decides to remove a child from the home of a parent, a legal
custodian, or a legal guardian, it must make a determination either that reasonable
effrnis to prevent the removal were made and were not successful or that rea onable
efforts to prevent removal were unnecessary. MCR 3.965(D)(I). In the reasonable
efforts detennination, "the child 's health and safety must be of paramount concern to
the court." MCR 3.965(D). This determination must be made "at the earliest possible
time," but not later than 60 days after the date of the removal. MCR 3.965(D)(l). The
court rule, MCR 3.965(D)(2), and Chi ld Protection Law, MCL 722.638, delineate certain factual circumstances, referred to in the court rule as "aggravated circumstances,"
in which reasonable efforts to prevent the child's removal from the home are unnecessary. In general, these "aggravated circumstances" involve allegations of serious
abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the chi ld.
The parties have the right to a hearing regarding placement. MCR 3.965(C)(l ).
The respondent must be given subpoena power and must be allowed to cross-examine
witnesses and offer evidence regarding placement. fd. The relevant statute and court
rule seem to be at odds regarding the proper criteria for the placement o f children in
or out of home care, with the statute providing narrower grounds for placement than
the court rule .
The Juven ile Code provides the court with authority to remove children from
their homes under certain circumstances:
If a petition alleges abuse by a person described in subsection (4) [a paren t, guardian
or lega l custodian], ... the court shal l no t leave the child in or return the chi.Id to the
child's home ... unless the court finds that the conditions of custody at the placement
and with the individua l with whom the child is placed are adequate to safeguard the
chi ld from the risk of ha rm to the child's life, physical health, or mental wel l-being.

MCL 7 I 2A. l 3a(5 ). For purposes of this section of the law, "abuse" is defined essentially the same as that tem1 is defined in the CPL. MCL 7 12A.13a(l5); cf MCL
722.622(0. As this provis ion makes clear, there is a statutory presumption that, when
a petition alleges "abuse," the chi ld \-viii be removed from parental custody. However,
the statute is silent regarding the placement of children when neglect is alleged. The
question then arises whether the legislature intended to restrict the court's authority to
place chi ldren when neglect rather than abuse is alleged .
The court rule grants much broader authority for the court to place children outside the parental home. It prov ides, "ff continuing the child 's residence in the home is
contrary to the welfare of the chi ld, the court shall not return the child to the home,
but shall order the child placed in the most family like setting avai lable consistent
with the child's needs. " MCR 3.965(C)(2). The phrase' contrary to the welfare of the
child" is defined in the definitional section of the rules. MCR 3.903(C)(3). It
"includes, but is not limited to, situations in which the child 's life, physical health, or
mental well-being is unreasonably placed at risk." The court must make its finding
regarding whether placement with a parent is "contrary to the welfare'' explicit, either
in writing or on the record and capable of being transcribed. MCR 3.965(C)(3) .
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The Juvenile Code provides that it is to be liberally construed to provide children
the care they need. MCL 7 I 2A. l (3). Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that
the family division bas "very broad authority" to craft orders to protect the well-being
of the chi ldren who are subject to its jurisdiction. In re Macomber, 436 Mich 386,
393,461 NW2d 671 ( 1990) (affirm ing authority of trial court to issue order at preliminary hearing directing father who allegedly sexually abused bis daughter to leave
family home and to pay support). Indeed, the court has noted that " [t]here are no limits to the 'conduct' which the court might find harmful 10 a child." Id. In addition the
court has "jurisdiction over adults as provided in [this chapter] and may make orders
affecting adults as in the opinion of the court are necessary for the physical, mental, or
moral well-being of a particular juvenile or juveniles under its jurisdiction." MCL
712A.6.
The law prefers, when consistent with children's welfare, that they not be
removed from the parental home. MCL 712A.1 (3). In 1998, the legislature amended
the Juvenile Code to specifically provide fami ly courts the authority to remove "a parent, guardian, custodian, nonparent adult, or other person residing in a child 's home."
MCL 712A.13a( 4). The court may invoke th is authority when (I) a petition has been
filed that alleges abuse on the part of the individual to be removed, (2) the court holds
a hearing and finds probable cause to believe the person to be removed perpetrated
the abuse, and (3) the court makes a finding on the record that the individual to be
ordered out of the home presents a substantial risk of hann to the child. ld. In determining whether to order an individual removed from the home, "the court may consider whether the parent who is to remain in the juvenile's home is matTied to the
person to be removed or has a legal right to retain possession of the home." [CL
712A.13a(6).
Because the court may cra'ft orders aimed at protecting a child while maintaining
the child in the family's home, counsel should consider what options are available to
ensure the child 's safety without removal. Each community in the state has a different
array of in-home services offered through the DHS as we ll as services available
through community mental health and various nonprofit programs that may be able to
offer assistance aimed at maintaining the child in the home.
When placement is necessary, the law prefers to place the child with relatives.
The court may order placement with a relative at the conclusion of a preliminary hearing. MCR 3.965(C)(4). Ifit does so, the court may require the agency supervising the
child 's placement to complete a criminal background check on the relative and report
its findings to the court witl1in 7 days. MCR 3.965(C)(4)(a). lfthe court orders a child
placed with a relative, it must order the agency to complete a home study on the relative within 30 days of placement. MCR 3.965(C)( 4)(b ). Regardless of where the child
is placed, when a child is removed from his or her home, the agency providing supervision of the child has 30 days to "identify, locate, and consult with relatives" to
determine if there is a suitable relative with whom to place the child. MCL
722.954a(2). The agency has 90 days to decide whether to place the child with a relative. Id.
The following persons are "related" to a child for purposes of placement: "an
individual who is at least 18 years of age and related to the child by blood, marriage,
or adoption, as grandparent, great-grandparent, great-great-grandparent, aunt or
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uncle, great-aunt or great-uncle, great-great-aunt or great-great-uncle, sibling, stepsibling, nephew or niece, first cousin or first cousin once removed, and the spouse of
any of the above, even after the marriage has ended by death or divorce." MCL
7 l2A.18(1)(b). A child may be placed with the parent of a man whom the court has
probable cause to believe is the putative father if there is no man with legally established rights to the child. Id. When a chi ld is placed with a relative pursuant to a court
order, that child is in "foster care." MCL 712A.13a(l)(e). llrns, a child could be
placed with a noncustodial parent, and this would be considered foster care.
When the court orders a child p laced outside the parental home, it may provide
the child with necessary medical treatment. Family Independence Agency v AMB (In
re AMB), 248 Mich App 144, 178- 182, 640 NW2d 262 (2001) (includes withdrawal
oflife support); see MCL 722.124a.
If a child is removed from the home of the parent, guardian , or legal custodian
and the case has not reached disposition the court must conduct a review hearing
regarding that child 's placement " within 182 days of the date of the cbj)d's removal
from the home." MCR 3.972(A).

IX. Pretrial Phase
A. In General
§22.33
In a child protective proceeding, the court may convene one or more
pretrial conferences. MCR 3.922(D). Pretrial conferences are governed by MCR
2.401. See MCR 3.922(D). There are two basic purposes for such a hearing: either
resolving the case without a trial by entering a pie.a, MCR 3.971, or preparing for trial.

B. Pleas
§22.34
A parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian may enter a plea admitting
to some or all of the allegations in a petition. Some courts require filing an amended
petition with on ly those allegations that will be admitted. The court mies also permit a
plea of no contest. MCR 3.97 I (A). A plea may be offered at any time after the petition is filed so long as the petitioner and the child's L-GAL have been apprised of the
plea and are provided an opportunity to object before the plea is accepted . Id.
Before taking a plea, the court must inform the parent of the allegations, the right
to counsel, and the rights given up by entering a plea. MCR 3.971 (B). 1l1e court must
infom1 the parent of the consequences of entering a plea, that the court will likely
assert protective jurisdiction over the child, that the child may be placed outside the
parental home, and that the plea may be used at a later stage in the proceedings as a
basis on which parental rights may be terminated. MCR 3.971(8)(4). The court must
satisfy itself that the plea is voluntary, knowing, and made with an understanding of
its consequences. MCR 3.971 (C). When one respondent parent enters a plea giving
the court j urisdiction over the child, the court has authority to enter orders regarding
both parents and "any adult" as necessary for the well-being of the child. MCR
3.973(A); Family Independence Agency v Bowman (ln re CR), 250 Mich App 185,
646 W2d 506 (2001 ). However, a parent who is not named as a respondent in the
proceeding cannot enter a plea giving the court jurisdiction as to the respondent-parent. Depai·tment of Hwnan Servs v Holm (In re SLH) , 277 Mich App 662, 747 NW2d
547, leave denied, 482 Mich 1007, 756 NW2d 86 (2008) (where mother was not
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respondent, her plea that respondent father had sexually abused couple's daughter was
insufficient to confer jurisdiction). The court must establish a basis for the plea either
by questioning the parent or, in the case of a no contest plea, through other means.
MCR 3.971 (C)(2).
The court rules are si lent regarding p lea withdrawal. The appellate courts have
treated etforts to withdraw pleas as analogous to the withdrawal of pleas in criminal
cases. In re Zelzack, 180 Mich App 117, 125, 446 W2d 588 ( 1989).

C. Preparing for Trial
l. Discovery
§22.35
Discovery is governed by MGR 3.922(A). Requests for materia ls that
are discoverable by right must be filed no later than 21 days before trial. Id. The court
may excuse a late filing in the interests of justice. Id. The court may, on the motion of
a party, grant a request for discovery of other materials. MCR 3.922(A)(2).
There are two statuto1y exceptions to a party's ability to discover material held
by the other parties. First, the Juvenile Code provides for the DHS, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, the attorney general, or other authorities to take a child's "videorecorded statement." MCL 712A. 17b. While all parties to the case may view the
recording, MCL 712A. I 7b(7), the recording itself is not discoverable. MCL
712A.17b( 11). Second, the law mandates that a child be appointed an L-GAL to represent her or his interests. MCL 7 I 2A. l 7c(7), 722.630. Any material in the L-GAL's
file is exempt from discovery. MCL 7 l2A. I 7d(3).
One important discovery tool is the court's a uthority Lo order various assessments. For example, the court may order a medical, dental, or psychological evaluation of the child who is the subject of the petition. MCL 7 J2A. I 2. The court may also
order an evaluation of a parent. MCR 3.923(8).
Unless the party seeking a discovery order for additional material has previously
requested and been denied access to the material, the court will not grant a discovery
request "absent manifest injustice." MCR 3.922(A)(2). The failure to comply with
d iscovery orders may result in the application of sanctions, including dismissal of the
case. See MCR 3.922(A)(4) (incorporating by reference MCR 2.313).
The court must authorize depositions before they are conducted. MCR
3.922(A)(3). In In re Lemmer, 19 1 Mich App 253,477 NW2d 503 (1991), the court
held that, because the then effective court rule permi tted the discovery of"materials"
and not "evidence," the court lacked the authority to permit a deposition of a child
who was the ~11bject of a child protective proceeding. The comt rule was subsequently
rewritten to specifically pem1it the court to authorize, in addition to " materials" discoverable as of right, "discovery of any other materials and evidence." MCR
3.922(A)(2) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Juvenile Code has been amended to
specifically provide for taking the videorecorded deposition of a child under 16 or a
minor over 16 who is developmentally delayed. MCL 7 I2A. l 7b. Thus, it appears that
the court has discretion to pennit the deposition of the chi ld who is the subject of a
protective proceeding. MCR 3.922(A)(3).
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2. Motion Practice
§22.36
Motion practice in protective proceedings is governed by MCR
3.922(C) and 2.119. Because the summary judgment rule, MCR 2.116, is not specifically incorporated by reference into the juvenile rules, it does not apply to ch ild protective proceedings. Family Independence Agency v Jones (in re PAP) , 247 Mich App
148, 640 W2d 880 (2001). Thus, the court may take jurisdiction of a child only by
adjudication or by a plea. Id.
Certain matters must be addressed in pretrial motions. Fir t, the court rules provide a "tender years" exception to the rule against hearsay:
Child :~ Statement. Any statement made by a chi Id under IO years of age or an incapacitated individual under 18 years of age with a developmental disability as defined

in MCL 330. l I00a(2 I) regarding an act of child abuse, child neglect, sexual abuse,
or sexual exploitation, as defined in MCL 722.622(t). G), (w), or (x), performed with
or on the child by anOlher person may be admitted into evidence through the testimony ofa person who heard the child make the statement as provided in th is subrule.
(a) A statement describing such conduct may be admitted regardless of whether the
child is available to testify or not, and is ubstantive evidence of the act or omission if
the cou,t hns found , in a hearing held before trial, that the circumstances surrounding
the giving of the statement provide adequate indicia of trustworthiness. This statement may be received by the court in lieu of or in addition to the child's testimony.
(b) If the child has testified a statement denying such conduct may be used for
impeachment purposes as permitted by the rules of e idence.
(c) If the child has not testified, a statement denying such conduct may be admitted
to impeach a statement admitted under subrule (2)(a) if the court has found, in a hearing held before trial, that the circumstances surrounding lhe giving of the statement
denying the conduct provide adequate indicia of trustworthiness.
MCR 3.972(C)(2). The court may admit hearsay statements made by a child under 10
years of age, or under 18 years of age if the child suffers from a developmental disabi lity, describing abuse or neglect that are imbued with adequate indicia of reliabi lity. See, e.g., In re Pardee, 190 Mich App 243, 475 W2d 870 (1991) (several
witnesses were permitted to testify regarding child's statements describing various
act of sexual abuse). ln examining the indicia of reliabil ity, the court in In re Brimer,
I 9 I Mich App 401 , 405.478 NW2d 689 (199 I), stated that, "[c]ircumstances indicating the reliability of a hearsay statement may include spontaneity and consistent repetition, the mental state of the declaranl, use of tenninology unexpected for a chi ld of
similar age, and a lack of motive to fabricate." Adequate indicia of reliability is to be
determined with reference to the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing Idaho v
Wright, 497 US 805 (1990)). Because the test is the totality of the circumstances, one
must assume that the list set out in Brimer is but a partial recitation of the relevant
indicators. Each case wil l need to be considered on its individual merits.
Next, the child's hearsay statements may be admitted without regard to whether
the child is available to testify or actually testifies. MCR 3.972(C)(2)(a). If the child
testifies, statements denying that child abuse or neglect has occurred may be used to
impeach the child on cross-examination. MCR 3.972(C)(2)(b). Simi larly, if the child
does not testify, reliable statements made by the child denying abuse or neglect may
be admitted under the amended rule. Social science research has repeatedly demonstrated that children falsely deny abuse and falsely recant previously asserted allega-
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tions. Children's advocates should be prepared to call expert witnesses at pretrial
tender years hearings to explain the research in this area. See Ann M. Haralambie,
Child Sexual Abuse in Civil Cases: A Guide lo Custody and Tort Actions 40---41
(1999); Lucy Berliner & Diana M . Elliott, Sexual Abuse of Children, in The APSAC
Handbook on Child Maltreatment 55-78 (John E. B. Myers et al eds, 2002).
Finally, the child's statements describing maltreatment may be admitted through
the testimony of any person who heard the child make the statement and need not be
admitted only through the testimony of the individual to whom the st atement is made.
MCR 3.972(C)(2). So, for example, if the child's lawyer is interviewing the child in
the presence of a foster care worker and the child makes statements describing abuse,
the child's statement may be admitted through the testimony of the foster care worker.
In determining whether the child's hearsay statement contains adequate indicia of
reliability to be adm itted pursuant to the tender years exception established in MCR
3.972(C)(2), the court may view a videorecordecl statement made by the child during
a forensic interview. Depanment of Human Servs v Nierescher (In re Archer) 277
Mich App 71, 744 NW2d l (2007). In Arche1; two children were interviewed by a
forensic interviewer at a child advocacy center regarding sexual abuse. The state
sought to admit the children's statements though the testimony of the forensic interviewer pursuant to MCR 3.972(C)(2). At the pretrial hearing required by MCR
3.972{C)(2), the presiding referee viewed a DVD of tbe forensic interview over the
father's objections that MCL 712A.17b(5) prohibited the admission of the DVD at
trial. The court overruled the father's objection because the pretrial tender years hearing was not the trial. After reviewing tl1e DVD of the interviews, the referee determined that the statements were sufficientJy reliable to admit into evidence via the
interviewer 's testimony. The court then terminated the parents' rights. The parents
appealed, arguing that admission of the DVD at the tender years hearing violated
MCL 712A. l 7b(5). Additionally, the mother argued that the admission of the DVD at
the pretrial hearing violated her right to due process of law. The court of appeals held
that neither MCL 712A. l 7b(5) nor the due process clause barred the admission of the
DVD of the forensic interview at the tender years hearing. Arche1; 277 Mich App at
8 I.
Even if a child's statements are not admissible pursuant to the tender years
exception contained in MCR 3.972(C)(2), they may be admissible pursuant to the
residual hearsay exception established by MRE 803(24). See People v Katt, 468 Mich
272, 662 NW2d 12 (2003) (child's statements describing abuse admitted where they
met test for reliability established in MRE 803(24)).
A second issue of interest concerning motion practice addresses the use of "videorecorded statements" and the taking of "v ideorecorded depositions." A videorecorded statement is a statement recorded by any method of videorecording. MCL
712A. l 7b( 1)(c ). A videorecorded statement is different from a videorecorded deposition, which is discussed below. Id. The Juvenile Code authorizes the OHS, law
enforcement personnel, the prosecuting attorney, the attorney general, or another person designated under the county's joint investigation protocol to take a videorecorded
statement from any child under 16 years of age or a minor over 16 years of age ifhe
or she suffers fro m a developmental disability. MCL 712A.17b(2)(b), (5); see MCL
712A.17b( I )(b) (defining developmental disability) , ( d) (defining witness) . If such a
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videorecorded statement is taken, it "shall be admitted at all proceedings except the
adjudication stage instead of the live testimony of the witness." MCL 712A. l 7b(5).
As noted, a videorecorded statement differs from a videorecorded deposition. A
videorecorded statement is not admissible at trial. MCL 7 l 2A. l 7b(5). On its own
motion or on the motion of a party, the court may order the taking of a "videorecorded
deposition" of a "witness." MCL 7 l 2A. l 7b(13) . Before ordering such a deposition,
the court must make a detennination on the record that the child witness would suffer
psychological harm if required to testify in open court Id.; see Department of Soc
Servs v Hensley (In re Hensley) , 220 Mich App 33 l, 560 NW2d 642 (1996) (court
need not utter phrase "psychological harm" before permitting child witness protections so long as it has actually considered issue); In re Van ids tine, 186 Mich App 205,
463 NW2d 225 ( 1990) (court made particularized findings of harm to child; protective measures were properly ordered).
When a videorecorded deposition of a witness is ordered, " (t]he examination and
cross-examination of the witness .. . shall proceed in the same manner as permitted at
the adjudication stage." MCL 712A.l 7b(I3) . If, however, the court fmds that the witness would suffer psychologicaJ harm if required to "testify in the presence of the
respondent," tl1e court may order that the child be "shielded from viewing the respondent in such a manner as to enable the respondent to consult with his or her attorney
and to see and hear the testimony of the witness without the witness being able to see
the respondent." MCL 712A.7b( 12). The Juvenile Code also permits the court to
order that a child witness be screened from the respondent when he or she testifies in
the courtroom. ld.
Counsel for the petitioner and the L-GAL should consider whether these or other
protective measures should be pursued and should file appropriate pretrial motions to
protect the child witness when necessary. Recall that the procedures set out in MCL
712A. l 7b are "in addition to other protections or procedures afforded to a witness by
law or court rule." MCL 712A. l 7b(l 8). Moreover, the Michigan Rules of Evidence
provide the court with broad authority to control the interrogation of witnesses. MRE
61l(a). Thus, the court may take additionaJ steps it deems necessary to ensure the
truth-seeking function of a trial. See James K. Robinson et al., Michigan Court Rules
Practice: Evidence 349 (2d ed 2002) (citing cases).

3. Pretria l otices
§22.37 The court rules require wTitten notice of intent to do the following:
(a) use a support person, including the identity of the support person, the relationship to the witness, and the anticipated location of the support person during the
hearing.
(b) request special arrangements for a closed coLutroom or for restricting the
view of the respondent/defendant from the witness or other spec.ial arrangements
allowed under law and ordered by the court.
(c) use a videotaped deposition as permitted by law.
(d) admit out-of-court hearsay statements under MCR 3.972(C)(2), including
the identity of the persons to whom a statement was made. the circumstances leadi.ng
to the statement, and the statement to be admitted.
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MCR 3.922(E); see also MCL 712A.l7b(4). Notice of these matters must be filed
with the court and served on the parties w ithin 21 days after notice of the trial date has
been provided but not later than 7 days before the trial. Within 7 days after the receipt
of the notice of intent but not later than 2 days before trial , the other parties must provide the court and the parties w ith written notice of intent to offer rebuttal testimony
or evidence in opposition to the request. MCR 3.922(E)(2). The written notice must
include the identity of the witnesses to be called. For good cause, the court may
shorten the time requirements of this rule.

X. Trial
A. Timing
§22.38
While child protec ti ve proceedings are generally informal , MCL
712A. 17( 1), the adj udi cation is conducted in a fo rmal manner. At trial , the Michigan
Rules of Evidence that apply to civil proceedings generally apply. MCR 3.972{C)(l ).
Those rules may be altered by the court rules. Id. ; see, e.g . MCR 3.972(C)(2).
The time frame for trying a child protection case is dictated by the child 's placement. If the child remains in parental custody after the preliminary hearing, the court
mu t try the case within six months from the date on which the petition was fi led.
MCR 3.972(A). If the child is placed outside parental custody, the trial "must commence as soon as possible," but not later than 63 days after placement. Id. Where the
child is in the home of a legal guardian and the guardian petitions the court to terminate parental rights pursuant to MCL 7 I2A .2(b)(3)-(5) and . I9b(3)(d)-( t), the chi ld is
not "in placement," so the adjudication may be held within six months of the filing of
the petition rather than 63 days. Russell v Miller (In re Utrera), 28 l 1ich App I, 910, 761 W2d 253 (2008). The court may continue the case beyond these time frames
under certain circumstances. The court rule provides that the case may be continued
on the stipu lation of the parties if there is good cause. MC R 3.972(A)( I). See also
MCL 712A. l 7( l). The court may also continue the trial when the "proce s cannot be
completed" or because the testimony of a witness is needed and that witness in not
available. MCR 3.972(A)(2)- (3). The statute requires that any request for a continuance be(]) in writing, (2) filed 14 days before the hearing, and (3) based on a finding
on the record of good cause. MCL 712A .1 7(l). Further, the statute pennits the court
to adjourn a hearing on it o,vn motion after taking into consideration the child 's best
interests but limits any continuance to 28 days. Id Continuances in ch ild protective
proceedings are disfavored. See e.g., Utrera. Thus, continuances may be granted only
for good cause. \Vhile neither the statute nor the court rules define " good cause," the
court of appeals has held that in order for a trial court to find good cause for an
adjournment, " ·a legally sutlicienl or substantial reason ' must be first be shown." Id.
at 11 (quoting FG v Washtenaw County Circuit Co urt (In re FG), 264 Mich App 413,
419, 691 NW2d 465 (2004)).
While both the statute and the court rules detail time frames to complete the trial,
they provide no penalties for failure lo do so. Failure to take an action or complete a
hearing within the time frame set by the statute or court rule will not result in dismissal of the petition or deprive the court of the authority to hear the case. See Family
Independence Agency 11 Coleman (In re TC) , 251 Mich App 368, 650 NW2d 698
(2002) (v iolation of 70-day time limit in MCL 712A. I9b( 1)); In re Kirkwood, 187
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Mich App 542,468 NW2d 280 (1991); In re King, 186 Mich App 458, 465 NW2d I
{1990) (time limits for hearing termination petition are not jurisdictional). While none
of these cases specifically addresses a court's fa ilure to hear an initial petition within
the ti me frame established in MCL 7 I 2A. I 7(1) or MCR 3.972(A), since these provisions have no penalty clause, they demonstrate how the court wo uld likely respond to
such a circumstance.
When the court continues the trial in a p rotective proceeding beyond the required
time frame for adjudication, the court rule presumes the child will be returned to
parental custody. MCR 3.972(A). The comt may continue placement of the child outside parental custody only if the presumption is overcome by a finding that return ing
the child to the parent's custody "will likely result in physical harm or serious emotional damage to the child." Id.
If the court orders the chi ld removed from the home of the parent, guardian, or
legal custodian, it must hold a review hearing in the case within 182 days, regardless
of whether the trial has been completed. Id.

B.

Referees, Judges, and Juries
§22.39
In mo t Michigan counties, the preliminary stages of child protection

proceedings are conducted before a referee. See MCL 712A.10; MCR 3.913. Except
as provided in MCR 3.912(A), which requires that a judge preside over certain hearings, a referee may preside at any hearing regarding a juvenile. For a referee to preside over a child protection trial, that referee must be licensed to practice law. MCR
3.9 l 3(A)(2}(b). However, a referee who is not licensed to practice law may preside
over a preliminary inquiry, a preliminary hearing, a progress review, or an emergency
removal hearing. Id.
A referee may administer oaths and examine witnesses. MCL 712A.I0(l)(b).
When a referee presides over a hearing that requires the taking of tes timony, the referee must make a written repo1t summarizing the testimony and including the referee's recommendations regarding the court's findings and disposition. MCL
712A.I0(l )(c). A referee has no authority to issue orders. Fami~y Independence
Agency v AMB (In re AMB), 248 Mich App 144, 216- 219, 640 NW2d 262 (2001) .
Such referee recommendations may not be accepted without judicial examination. Id.
Any party may, by a timely filed written demand, assert the right to have a judge
or a j ury hear the case. MCL 712A. 17(2); MCR 3.911 - .912. The demand must be
fi led by the later of 14 days after the court gives notice of a right to a jmy trial or
w ithin 14 days after the attorney or L-GAL files an appearance. MCR 3 .91 1(8),
.91 2(8). Generally, the demand must be filed at least 21 days before tria l. MCR
3.91 l(B), .912(8). The right to dem and a jury is waived if a demand is not filed
timely. In re Hubel, 148 Mich App 696, 699, 384 NW2d 849 ( 1986). The court may
excuse a late filing. Id.
The jury in a protective proceeding consists of six ind ividuals. MCL 7 I 2A. l 7(2) ;
MCR 3.91 l. The jury has reached a verdict whe n five of its members agree. MCR
3.9 I l{C)(2)(b ). The purpose of the jury is to find facts, that is, to determine whether
the court has jurisdiction un er MCL 7 12A.2(b). Jn re Mathers, 371 M ich 516, 531 532, 124 NW2d 878 (1963). When a jury determines that the facts presented do not
bring the child within the jurisdictional provisions ofMCL 7 12A.2(b), the court must
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dismiss the case. Id. The right to a jury is only available at the adjudicative phase of
the proceedings. Mathers: Hubel; In re Oakes, 53 Mich App 629, 220 NW2d 188
( 1974) (disposition is sole province of court). There is no right to a jury trial when a
supplemental petition is filed . In re Miller, 178 Mich App 684, 445 NW2d 168
(1989).
The Committee on Model Civil Jury Instructions has adopted jury instructions
for child protection proceedings. See M Civ JI 97.0 1-.52.
C. Evidentia ry Issues
§22.40
The Michigan Rules of Evidence apply at the trial phase of a proceeding. MCR 3.972(C). In addition, MCR 3.972(C)(2) permits the court to adm it the
hearsay statements of children describing acts of chi ld abuse or neglect perpetrated on
the child if at a pretrial hearing the court has found that the statements have adequate
i.ndicia of reliability.
Some fonns of child maltreatment require the presentation of complex medical or
mental health evidence. The legislahtre has required the use of two protocols to aid
professionals in investigating chi ld maltreatment. For example, MCL 722.628(6)
requires each county to establ ish a joint investigation and a forensic interviewing protocol. See State of Michigan, Governor's Task Force on Children's Justice, A Model
Child Abuse Protocol.- Coordinated Investigative Team Approach, at http://
,,.,.ww.michigan.gov/documents/gtfcj/F'IA-Pub 794-Model_Chi Id_Abuse_protocolVersion I_ 179026_7.pdf; State of Michigan, Governor's Task Force on Chi ldren's Justice and Department of Human Services, Forensic Interviewing Protocol (GTF Protocol), at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/DHS-PUB-0779_ 21 1637_7 .pdf In
addition, the Governor's Task Force on Children 's Justice bas drafted a protocol fo r
handling cases of Munchausen syndrome by proxy. State of Michigan Governor's
Task Force on Children's Justice, Munchausen By Proxy: A Collaborative Approach to
Investigation, Assessment and Treatment, available at http://wwv•. michjgan.gov/documents/gtfcj/Pub- l 7-l\1BP_1_178076_7.pdf.
Courts have addressed some of the evidentiary problems unique to child mal treatment cases. The Michigan Court of Appeals has approved the use of a "slideshow
simulation" of shaken baby syndrome as a fonn of demonstrative evidence. People v
Bulmer, 256 Mich App 33, 662 W2d 117 (2003). The evidence was properly admitted to "explain what happens to the baby 's brain during a shaken baby episode." Id. at
34. Because the slide show was offered to illustrate the expert's testimony rather than
as a reenactment of what happened to the paiticu lar child, it was admissible.
Some fonns of child abuse are notoriously difficult to prove. This is perhaps
most true of se>.."11al abuse. To prove these cases, litigators often rely on a combination
of the testimony or hearsay statements of young children and expert witness testimony offered by mental health professionals.
The model forensic interviewi ng protocol was developed as a response to concerns about the way professionals interview young children. Its intent is to improve
the reliability of children's disclosures about abuse. See State of M ichigan, Governor 's Task Force on Children's Justice and Family Independence Agency, Forensic
JiJtervie111ing Protocol (GTF Protocol) l. When an interview is properly conducted,
the child's hearsay statements regarding child abuse may be admitted through a pro22-38
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tective services worker or others. See, e.g. , People v Kalt, 468 Mich 272, 662 W2d
12 (2003); In re Brimer, 191 Mich App 40 I 478 NW2d 689 (1991 ). If a forensic
interview with a child is videorecorded, that videorecording may be admitted at a tender years bearing to determine whether the child's statements contain adequate indicia
of reliabi lity to be admitted at trial. Department of Human Sen1s v Nierescher (In re
Arche1), 277 Mich App 71,744 W2d I (2007). The lender years exception in MCR
3.972(C)(2) permits the admission of some hearsay statements; the residual hearsay
exception is another potential means by which a child's hearsay statements may be
admitted, see Kaff.
While the MCR 3.972(C)(2) tender years exception applies only to statements
made by children under IO years old and developmentally delayed minors, the residual hearsay exception in MRE 803(24) has no such age limit. Thus, if a minor's statement meets the test of tnistworthiness, it may be admitted pursuant to MRE 803(24)
without regard to age. In Kau, the court specifically rejected the so-called "near miss"
theory of admissibility. That is, the fact that MCR 3.972(C)(2) specifically addresses
the admission of a child's hearsay statements does not preclude the court from considering the admission of such a statement under the more general residual exception.
Katt, 468 Mich at 281 n2.
In People v Meeboer, 439 1ich 310, 484 NW2d 621 ( 1992), the court ruled that
a child's statement made to a medical professional identifying the perpetrator may be
admitted pursuant to the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the rule against
hearsay. MRE 803(4). Before admitting such a statement, the court must be satisfied
that "the statement [is] sufficiently reliable to support that exception's rationale."
Meeboe;; 439 Mich at 330. The court set out numerous factors that should be considered in detem1ining whether to admit such a statement. Id. at 325. The court also suggested that trial courts should examine the presence or absence of corroborating
evidence. Id. While the absence of corroborating evidence does not render the child's
statement unreliable, its presence "can support the trustworthiness of the child's statements." Id. (Although MCR 3.972(C)(2) has been amended to eliminate the corroboration requirement, evidence that corroborates such a statement remains very
important. See MCR 3.972(C)(2)(a).)
The presentation of expert witnesses is crucial to adjudicating some child protective proceedings. The courts have established a three-part test for detennining
whether to admit expert testimony: (I) whether the expert is qualified, (2) whether the
expert's testimony will provide the trier of fact with a better understanding of the evi dence, and (3) whether the evidence is from a recognized discipline. People v Wentworth (In re Wentworth), 251 Mich App 560, 651 NW2d 773 (2002). In People v
Beckley 434 Mich 691, 456 NW2d 391 ( 1990), the court held that an expert witness
may not render an ultimate opinion on whether a child has been sexually abused. The
court applied the Beckley rule to child protective proceedings in Brime,; 191 Mich
App at 407-408. Subsequently, in People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 537 W2d 857
(1995), the court clarified its holding in Beckle_1,: explaining that "[an] expert may testify regarding typical symptoms of child sexual abuse for the sole purpose of explaining a victim's specific behavior that might be incorrectly construed by the jury as
inconsistent with that of an abuse victim or to rebut an attack on the victim's credibility." Peterson. 450 Mich at 373. The court went on to clarify:
22-39
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We hold that the prosecution may present ev idence, if relevant and he lpful , to generally exp lain the commo n posti ncident behavior of children who are victims of sex ua l
abuse The prosecution may, in commenting on the evidence adduced at tria l, argue
the reasonable inferences drawn from the expert's testimo ny and compare the expe1t
testimony to the fac ts of the case. Unl ess a defendant raises the issue of the particular
chi ld victim's postincident behavior or attacks th e child's c redibili ty, an ex pe1t may
not testify that the particular c hild victi m's behavior is consistent with that of a sex ually abused child. Such testimony would be improper because it comes too close to
testi f}1 ing that the particular child is a victim of sex ual abuse.

Id. Given the court's importation o.f the crim inal rule from B eckley into protective
proceedings in Bri111e1; one must conclude that Peterson's clarification also appl ies in
the child protection context.
As long ago as the 1970s, the court he ld that a parent 's treatment of one child is
probative of that parent's treatment of other children. In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich
App 2 19,263 W2d 37 ( 1977); 111 re La Flure, 48 Mich App 377,21 0 NW2d 482
( 1973). This doctrine, known as "anticipatory neglect," has been extended to nonparent adults. In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 528 NW2d 799 (1995). It is not, however, automatically detenninative. In re Smebak, I 60 Mich App 122, 408 Mich App
11 7 ( I987); In re Kantola, 139 Mich App 23, 36 I W2d 20 ( I984). Thus, the court
may tenninate the rights of a parent to one child while re turning another child to
parental custody. See. e.g.. id.
In Powers. a man was cohabiting with a woman a nd was found responsible for
having injured her child from another re lationship. The man and wom an subsequently
had a child together. The trial court, relying on anticipatory neglect, found jurisdiction
asserting that the father 's treatment of the mother's other child was probative of his
likely treatment of his own child. The court of appeals affirmed. Powers. 208 Mich
App at 582. The doctrine of anticipatory neglect has been codified for certain limited
factual situations. See Family Independence Agency v Glass (In re AH) , 245 Mich
App 77, 627 W2d 33 (2001) (when parent's rights to previous child have been terminated and CPS has deemed parent's subsequent child to be "at risk," legislature has
essen ti ally codified doctrine of anticipatory neglect).
A putative father 's conduct befo re he establishes his paternity of the child may be
considered in adjudicating his rights. D epart111ent of Human Servs v Davis (In re Jordan), 278 Mich App I , 747 NW2d 883 (2008).
At the conclusion of the proo fs, the child 's L-GAL " may" make a recommendation to the court regarding whether grounds to assert jurisdiction have been proved.
MCR 3.972(D). This permissive language is at odds with MCL 712A .17d, which
requires tl1at the L-GAL actively participate in the proceedings by representing the
child 's best interests . See Family Jndepende11ce Agency v AMB (In re AMB), 248 Mich
App 144, 640 W2d 262 (2001) (child is entitled to effective assistance ofcow1sel);
In re Shaffer, 213 Mich App 429 540 N W2d 706 ( 1995) (child is entitled to zealous
advocate). The L-GAL may be required to submit a recommendation in writing so
long as confidentiality is protected.Rl-318 (Mar 22, 2000).
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XI. Dispositional Phase
A. In General
§22.41
After adjudication, if the court asserts jurisdiction, the case moves into
an extended dispositional phase. A juvenile proceeding is continuous, and a subsequently filed petition does not create a new case. In re Miller, 178 Mich App 684,445
NW2d 168 (1989). The dispositional phase of a child protective proceeding consists
of an initia l dispositional hearing, periodic review hearings, and possibly one or more
permanency planning and tem1ination of parental rights hearings. In the dispositional
phase, the rules of evidence generally do not apply and the court may rely on any relevant and material evidence to the exient of its probative value. Id. Thus, it was not
error for the cou1t to rely on reports not formally admitted into evidence. In re King,
l 86 Mich App 458, 465 W2d 1 ( 1990). Similarly, the court may properly consider a
report from the Foster Care Review Board (FCRB). In re Shawboose, 175 Mich App
637, 438 NW2d 272 (1989). The court may consider a parent's no contest plea to
criminal charges involving child abuse in the dispositional phase. In re Andino, 163
Mich App 764,415 W2d 306 (1987). As part of its dispositional order in a child
protective proceeding, the court may order one or both of the child's parents to pay
child support. MCR 3.973(F)(5). Any such order for support must comply wi h MCL
552.605 and MCR 3.211 (D). [CR 3.973(F)(5).

B.

Initial Dispositional Hearings
1. Procedural Issues
§22.42
The initjal dispositional hearing is held "to determine what measures
the court will take with respect to a child properly within its jurisdiction." MCR
3.973(A); see Family Independence Agency v Jones (In re PAP), 247 Mich App 148,
640 NW2d 880 (2001) .
The court must enter a dispositional order "as provided in the Juvenile Code and
these rules." MCR 3.973(F)(I ). The statute and rules read together constitute a broad
grant of authority to trial courts to enter orders necessary for the well-being of the
child. In re Macomber, 436 Mich 386, 461 W2d 671 (1990); see MCL 712A.6
("The court . .. may make orders affecting adul ts as in the opinion of the court are
necessary for the physical, mental, or moral well-being of a particular juvenile."). The
court may change custody from one parent to another. In re Brown, 171 fich App
674, 430 NW2d 746 ( 1988). The court may, but is not required to, consider the child
custody factors established in the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq.Family
Independence Agency v Pantaleon (In re EP), 234 Mich App 582, 595 NW2d 167
( 1999), overruled in part on other gro unds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341 , 612 W2d
407 (2000); Family Independence Agency v lvfil!er (In re Sherman), 231 Mich App
92,585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Trejo.
The court may hold the dispositional hearing immediately on the conclusion of
the adjudication or plea. MCR 3.973(B). If the court does not hold the hearing immediately after the jurisdictional hearing, the court must do so within 28 days of the trial
if the child is placed outside the parent's home, unless there is good cause for a longer
delay. MCR 3.973(C).
In Department of Human Servs v Cox (In re AlviAC) , 269 Mich App 533, 711
W2d 426 (2006), there was an adjudicative trial that concluded with the trial court's
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rendering its written opin ion and order terminating respondent's parental rights without a dispositional hearing either immediately following the trial or by proper notice
after the trial. Further, the trial court did not address the child's best interests in its
opinion, another deviation from the clear mandate that the child's best interests be
considered and that such findings and conclusions be stated in the record or in writing. Because respondent's rights under MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 3.973, and .977(E),
were erroneously denied, the order terminating her parental rights was vacated, and
the case remanded fo r a dispositional hearing.
If, after the assertion of jurisdiction, the court continues the matter for a later dispositional hearing, the court may give notice of that later date either on the record or
as required by MCR 3.920 . MCR 3.973(8). A parent does not have an absolute right
to be present at a dispositional hearing. See In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 501
Mich App 23 l (1993). Indeed, the court rules permit incarcerated parents to attend the
proceedings via telephone. MCR 2.004. ote that this rule does not apply to prisoners
incarcerated outside of Michigan. Family Independence Agency v Davis (In re BAD),
264 Mich App 66, 690 NW2d 287 (2004).
A child may be excused from a dispositional hearing, MCR 3.973(D)( l ),
although the child has a right to attend any hearing in the process if he or she wishes
to do so, MCL 7 12A.12. Unlike for review hearings, MCL 712A.l8d(4); MCR
3.92l(B)(2); PPHs, MCL 712A.l9a(4)(h); MCR 3.921(B)(2); and termination of
parenta l rights hearings, MCL 712A.19b(2)(h); MCR 3.92 l (8)(3), a child is not entitled to notice of the initial dispositional hearing. If proper notice is given, the court
may conduct the disposition without the parties being present. MCR 3.973(0 )(3).
If a petition alleging additional acts of abuse or neglect is filed regarding a child
already under the court's jurisdiction and the petition does not contain a request for
termination of parental rights, the petition is handled pursuant to MCR 3.974 (child
placed in parent's home) or MCR 3.975 (child placed outside parent's home).
2. Evidence
§22.43
The rules of evidence do not apply at the dispositional hearing. The
court may consider any relevant evidence, including the results of any comt-ordered
assessments or treatment. MCR 3.973(E)(l). Before entering a disposition, the court
must consider the treatment plan developed by the agency. See MCL 7 l 2A. l 8f. That
plan must outline what efforts were made to preserve the family unit, the recommended placement of the child, efforts made by the parents to achieve the child's
return to the parental home, and a schedule of services aimed at rehabilitating the parent and meeting the child's needs. Id. The case plan must provide for parenting time at
least once per week unless parenting time, even if supervised by the agency, would be
harmful to the child's well-being. MCL 7 l 2A. I 8f(3)(e). The court must also consider
any wTitten or oral information concerning the child from the child 's parent, guardian,
custodian, foster parent, relative caregiver, or L-GAL. MCL 7l2A.l8f(4). Whi le the
DHS will develop a parent-agency agreement (PAA) with the parent regarding services, the court has the authority to order the parent to engage in those contained in
the PAA, as well as additional services. It is the parent's compliance with and benefit
from the court-ordered services- not just those in the PAA- from which progress
will be measured. See In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341 , 360- 36 1, 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
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If a child has suffered ftom (I) failure to thrive, (2) Munchausen syndrome by
proxy, (3) shaken baby syndrome, (4) a bone fracture that results from child abuse or
neglect, or (5) drug exposure, the agency is required to review the treatment plan with
the child's treating physician. MCL 712A. l8f(6). If one of these types of hann has
befallen the child, the court must provide the physician notice of the dispositional
hearing and permit the physician to testify regarding the treatment plan. MCL
712A. l 8f(7).
3.

Dispositional Options
a. Dismiss or Warn and Dismiss
§22.44
If the court finds that the child does not come within the court's jurisdiction, it must enter an order dismissing the petition and rettm1ing the child to the
custody of his or her parent, legal guardian, or custodian. MCL 7 l 2A. l 8( l ); In re La
Flure, 48 Mich App 377,210 W2d 482 (1973). The Juvenile Code pennits the court
to warn a neglectful or abusive parent and dismiss the case. MCL 7 I 2A.18( 1)(a).
b. Child Placed in Parent's Home
§22.45
The court may place a child in the parent's home under the supervision
of the court and the OHS. MCL 7 l 2A. l 8( 1)(b); see MCR 3.974. If this option is used,
the court must periodically review the case. MCR 3.974(A)(l). The court must conduct such a review not later than l 82 days from the date on which the petition was
filed. MCR 3.974(A)(2). If the court asserts jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 7 J2A.2(b),
it must conduct a review hearing every 91 days for the first year, MCR 3.974(A)(2),
and every 182 days after the first year for as long as the child is subject to the court's
jurisdiction. id.
Absent an emergency, the court may not order a child removed from the parental
home without first holding a hearing. MCR 3.974(A)(3); Family Independence
Agency v Pamaleon (In re EP) , 234 Mich App 582, 595 NW2d 167 (1999), overruled
in part on other grounds by in re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,612 NW2d 407 (2000). In EP.
the trial court placed the child, who had been in foster care, back into the parent's
home on an "extended visit." Pursuant ro that order, the child resided in the mother's
home for four months. The court of appeals found that the chi ld had in fact been
returned home, so a preremoval hearing was required. Id.
ln an emergency, the court may order the child temporarily removed from parental care after having returned the child. MCR 3 .974(8)( I). If the court does so, it must
l1old an emergency removal hearing within 24 hours after the child is removed from
the parent's custody. MCR 3.974(B)(3). If the court does not return the child to the
parent's custody following the emergency removal hearing, the court must make findings regarding why retmn would be contrary to the welfare of the child. Id. ( citing
MCR 3.965(C)(2)). At the emergency removal hearing, the parent has the right to a
written statement of the reasons for the removal. MCR 3.974(B)(3)(a). The parent
must be given an opportunity at the emergency removal hearing to make a statement
regarding why the child should not be removed. MCR 3.974(B)(3)(b). If the child is
not returned to the parent, the court must hold a dispositional review hearing within
14 days. MCR 3.974(C). At the emergency removal hearing, the court must infonn
the parent of the right to be represented by counsel, to contest continued out of home
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placement of the child, and to subpoena witnesses for the dispositional review hearing. MCR 3.974(8).

c. Place with a Relative
§22.46
The cou1t may, if it orders a child placed at a preliminary hearing.
direct that the child be placed with relatives. MCL 712A.13a(l0); MCR 3.965(C)(2).
The following persons are " related" to the child within the meaning of the Juvenile
Code:
an indiv idual "vho is at least ! 8 years of age and re lated to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption, as grandparent, great-grandparent, great-great-grandparent, aunt
or Lmcle, great-aunt or great-uncle, great-great-aunt or great-great-uncle, sibling,
stepsibling, nephew or niece, first cousin or first cousin once removed, and the
spouse of any of the above, even after the marriage has ended by death or divorce.

MCL 712A.18(l)(b). The law prefers that children be placed in the most family-like
setting available that will meet the child's needs. MCL 712A.1(3); MCR 3.965(C).
The DHS must conduct a criminal records check within 7 days of the placement
and undertake a complete home study within 30 days of the child's placement. MCL
7 l 2A .13a(9). When a child is placed into foster care, the agency responsible for the
child's supervision has 30 days to " identify, locate and consult with relatives to determine placement with a fit and appropriate rel ative" who can adequately provide for
the child's needs. MCL 722.954a(2). Having located relatives, the agency must make
a decision regarding placement of the child within 90 days. Id. The decision must be
in writing, and the parties to the case and the interested relatives must be notified. Id.
If a relative who wishes to provide care for a child is denied the opportunity to do so
by the agency, he or she may request that the chi ld's L-GAL review that decision.
MCL 722.954a(3). If the L-GAL agrees with the relative, the L-GAL must fi le a
motion asking the court to place tl1e child with the relative. Id.
While the law prefers placement with a relative, there is no duty to place a child
into a relative's care. In re Futch, 144 Mich App 163, 375 NW2d 375 (1984). The
actual decision whether to place a particular child with a relative is discretionary and
rests with the comt, which must consider both the availability of relative caretakers
and the child's best interests. Id. The fact that relatives are willing to care for a child is
not a defense to a petition to terminate parental rights. Id ; see also In re McIntyre,
192 Mich App 47, 480 NW2d 293 (1991); In re Sterling, 162 Mich App 328, 412
W2d 284 (1987).
The VHS interprets the law to permit it (and the court) to place children with
"fictive kin,"-unrelated individuals with whom the chi ld or family has a relationship
( e.g., a friend of the fami ly or a neighbor). See DHS policy FOM 722-3 at 19, available at http://www.mfia.state.mi .us/olmweb/ex/fom/722-3.pdf. The agency's policy
indicates that MCL 712A.13a(5) provides authority for such a placement. Nothing in
that provision, however, explicitly permits the court to place a child .,vith an unrelated,
unlicensed individual. While some courts ,vill agree to placements with " fictive kin ."
the legal basis fo r such a placement is questionable.
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d. Place in Foster Care
§22.47
The court may place a child in foster care. MCL 712A.18(l)(c); see
MCL 712A.13a(l)(d) (defining /osier care to mean, among other things, "a foster
family home"). When a child is a ward of the court based on abuse or neglect, the foster home must not be supervi ed by the court. Id. For the general requirements of foster care providers, see the Foster Care and Adoption ervices Act, MCL 722.951 et
seq.
Developments in the law in the late 1990s and early 2000s have given foster parents increasing influence in child protective proceedings. After the 90-day pe1iod
described in §22.46 for identifying, locating, and deciding on relative placements, a
foster parent gain certain procedural rights that must be observed before a chi Id may
be removed. MCL 712A.13b. Once a chi ld has been out of the home for 90 days, the
supervising agency must provide the foster parent with 3 day's notice of its intent to
move the chi ld . MCL 712A.13b(2)(b). The fos ter parent may appeal the agency's
decision to re-place the child to the FCRB within 3 days of the notice. Id. Absent reasonable cause to suspect that the child has been abused or that there is a "substantial
risk of harm to the child's emotional well-being," the agency may not re-place the
child pending the appeal to the FCRB. MCL 7 l 2A. l 3b(7). The FCRB has 7 days to
investigate the child's placement and 3 days after completion of the investigation to
report its findings and recommendations to the court or the MCI superintendent (if
committed to the MCI). MCL 712A. I 3b(3) . If the FCRB agrees with the agency, the
agency may move the child. MCL 712A.13b(4). If the FCRB disagrees with the
agency the agency must maintain the child 's placement unti l the court or the MCI
superintendent determines the child's placement. MCL 712A. 136(5).
e. Appoint a Legal Guardian
§22.48
The dispositional provisions of the Juveni le Code pennit the court to
appoint a legal guardian for the child. MCL 712A.18(I)(h). If the court does so, it
may, but is not required to, dismiss the child protective proceeding. Id.
4. Dispositional Orders
§22.49
At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court must enter an
order of disposition. MCR 3.973(F)( I). Before doing so, it must examine the case service plan offered by the agency. MCR 3.973(f)(2). Case plans "provide guidance to
the agency, parent and court in assessing a parent's progress toward reunification.
They typically outline the services that will be provided and the expectations of the
parent regarding services and visitations." In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 346 n3, 612
2d 407 (2000). The court may adopt all or any part of the case service plan developed by the agency and may enter additional orders as it deems necessary for the
child's well-being. MCR 3.973(F)(2); see In re Jacobs , 433 Mich 24,444 NW2d 789
(1989). The court' authority is broad. In re Macomber, 436 Mich 386 461 NW2d
671 (1990). Unless previously ordered, an order of disposition must require the parent
to provide the OHS or it contract agency with the names of the child's medical providers as well as an order that each o f those providers release to lhe agency the child's
medical records. MCR 3.973(F)(4); see MCL 722 .954c (discussing medical passports).
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C. Postdispositional Reviews
1. In General
§22.50
When a child is under the jurisdiction of the court, the court must
review the case periodically. MCL 712A.19(3 ). If the child is in foster care, the first
review must take place within 182 days of the child 's removal from the parental
home. MCL 7 I 2A. l 9; MCR 3.975(C)(J ). The court rule requires a review hearing be
held every 91 days after the issuance of the initial dispositional order for the first year
the child is in foster care. Id. If the child remains under the court's jurisdiction beyond
one year, the court need review the case only every 182 days for as long as the child
remains a temporary ward of the court. Id. If the child is placed pennanently with a
relative or is the subject of a permanent foster family agreement, the court need
review the case 011ly every 182 days. Id.
The cou1t may utilize two-way video technology to facilitate review hearings.
MCR3.904.
The court rules distinguish between reviews when the child is placed in the
parental home, MCR 3.974, and reviews when the child is placed in ''foster care."
MCR3 .975.

2. Children Placed at Home
§22.51
If a child was never removed from his or her home, or has been
returned to a parent's home after having been placed in foster care, the court must
review the case no later than 182 days from the date the petition was filed, MCR
3.974(A)(2), and every 91 days after that first review for the first year that the child is
a ward of the court, id. After the first year that the child is a ward of the court, the
court must hold a review hearing every 182 days until the court's jurisdiction terminates. Id. If the child was removed from the home of the parent, guardian, or legal
custodian and placed in foster care, then returned to the parent's custody, MCR 3.975
governs the handling of the case rather than MCR 3.974. The court may not order the
child removed from parental custody at a "review." MCR 3.974(A)(3). Absent a
showing that removal is necessary to protect the child's "health, safety, or welfare,"
the court may not order the child removed from parental custody without first holding
a hearing. MCR 3.974(8); see Family Independence Agency 1' Pantaleon (In re EP),
234 Mich App 582, 595 NW2d 167 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by In
re Trejo, 462 Mich 341 , 6 12 NW2d 407 (2000). When a child was placed in the parental home on an "extended visit" for four months, the court held that the child was
p laced in the home and that a hearing was necessary to effect removal. Id.
ff the court detennines that removal is necessary to protect the ch ild's "health,
safety, or welfare,'' the cou1t may order removal on an emergency basis. MCR
3.974(B)(l). If the court orders the child removed before holding a hearing, the court
must hold an emergency removal hearing within 24 hours (excluding Sundays and
holidays) after the placement. MCR 3.974(B)(3). If the child is placed outside the
parental home at the emergency removal hearing, the court must hold a dispositional
review hearing within 14 days. MCR 3.974(C).
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3. Children in Foster Care
§22.52
When a child is placed in out-of-home care, the court must conduct
dispositional review hearings " to pem1it court review of the progress made to comply
with any order of disposi tion and with the case service plan." MCR 3.975(A); see
MCL 7 I 2A. l 9. The law requires that the court conduct the fi.rst review hearing within
182 days of the child's removal from tbe parental home . MCL 712A. l 9(3 ); MCR
3.975(C)(l). The court must conduct subsequent review hearings every 91 days for
the first year the child is under the court's jurisdiction. Id. After the first year, the
court must conduct a review hearing every 182 days from the date of the previous
review hearing until the case is dismissed. Id. [fthe child is placed with a relative and
that placement is intended to be permanent (i .e., the pennanency plan for the child is
not to return to parental custody) or the child is placed pursuant to a permanent foster
family agreement, the court must hold a revi ew hearing in the case every 182 days for
as long as the child is a ward of the court. MCR 3.975(C)(2). Even if a tennination of
parental rights petition has been filed or another matter is pending (e.g. , a petition for
guardianship), these mandatory review hearings cannot be cancelled or postponed
beyond the legally required number of days. MCR 3.975(C).
The agency must submit a report to the court regarding the family members '
progress or lack of progress. MCL 712A .18f; MCR 3.975(£). The agency's report
must comply with the requirements of MCL 712A. l 8f. The report must be made
available to the parties to the case, and it must be offered in evidence. MCL
7 I 2A. l 9( 11 ); MCR 3.975(E). In addition to the agency 's report, the court must consider any other information, written or oral, offered by the parent or the child 's caregiver. Id.
The criteria for the review is set out in MCR 3.975(F). The court must consider
( l) the services provided to the family ; (2) whether the parent benefitted from the services provided or offered; (3) the extent of parenting time and the reasons ifit did not
take place or was infrequent; ( 4) the extent to which the parent complied with the case
plan, court orders, and any agreement with the agency; (5) the likely han11 to the child
if the chi ld is returned to the parent; and (6) if the child is an Indian child, whether the
child's placement remains appropriate and complies with MCR 3.967. MCR
3.975(F)(l). Based on these considerations, the court must determine what progress
has been made to alleviate the need for continued foster care placem ent and may
rev iew the concurrent plan if applicable. MCR 3 .975 (F)(2). The court must also enter
an order regarding placement and services to be provided that will serve the needs of
the child. MCR 3.975(0). At a dispositional review hearing, the court has authority to
order that the child be returned home on 7 days ' written notice to all the parties. MCR
3.975(H). However, a party may waive this notice requirement. Id. If the court
receives a written notice of the intent to return the child to the parental home and no
party objects, the court may order the child returned home without holding a hearing.
Id.

D. Permanency Planning Hearings
§22.53
A PPH is held to detennine "the status of the child and the progress
being made toward the child's return home or to show why the child should not be
placed in the permanent custody of the court." MCL 7 l 2A. l 9a(3 ). A PPH "is based
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on the premise that a failure to quickly decide on a long-term care plan for the child
could be detrimental to the minor." In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 431 n5, 505 W2d
834 ( 1993 ). Generally, if a child is removed from the home of the parent, guardian, or
legal custodian, the court must hold a PPH no later than 12 months after the date on
which the child was removed. MCR 3.976(8)(2); MCL 712A. l 9a( I). The court must
hold a PPH at this time even if a petition to terminate has been filed and is pending.
MCR 3.976(8)(2). The court must, however, hold a PPH within 28 days after there is
a judicial determ ination that reasonable effort to reunite the child and family are not
required. MCR 3.976(B)(I). Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and fam ily must
be made in all cases except if any of the following apply:
(a) There is a judicia l determination that the parent has subjected the child to
aggravated circumstances as prov ided in [MCL 722.638].
(b) The parent has been convicted o f I or more of the following:
(I ) Murder of another child o f the parent.
(ii) Vo Iuntary manslaughter of anothe r chi Id of the parent.
(iii) Aiding or abetting in the murder of another child of the parent or volun tary
manslaughter of another chi ld of the parent, the attempted murder of the child or
another child of the parent, or the conspiracy or solicitation to commit the murder of
the child or another child of the parent.
(iv) A fe lony assault th at results in erious bodily injury to the child or another
child o f the parent.
(c) The parent has had rights to the child 's siblings involuntarily term inated.

MCL 7 I 2A. l 9a(2); see also MCR 3.976(B)(l)(b) . The court may hold a PPH earl ier
than requi.red. MCR 3.976(8)(2). The court must hold a PPH every 12 months after
the initial PPH if the chi ld remains a court ward. MCR 3.976(8)(3). With in these time
lines, there must be a "judicial detem,ination to finalize the court-approved permanency plan." MCR 3.976(B)(4).
The parties, including children who are 11 years of age or older, their attorneys,
foster parents, relative caregivers, and other persons as the court may dete1111ine, must
be provided notice ofa PPH 14 days before the hearing. ICL 712A.19a(4). If the
parents' rights have not been tenninated, they must be notified of the PPH. MCR
3.976(C).
At the PPH the rules of evidence do not apply, and the court must consider any
written infomrntion provided by the parties, the child's caregiver, and "any other evidence . .. offered at the hearing.' MCL 7 12A. l 9a(8). If the court determines at the
hearing that returning the child to the parent will not place the child at a substantial
risk of harm, the court must order the child returned to the parent's custody. MCL
7 I2A. l 9a(5). ff the parent has not substantially complied with the case service plan,
the court must preswne that return of the child to the parent will present a substantial
risk of harm to the child. Id. ; in re Ti·ejo , 462 Mich 341 , 360- 363 , 612 W2d 407
(2000).
On the other hand, "the parent's compliance wi th the parent-agency agreement is
evidence of her ability to provide proper care and custody." Family lndepe11de11ce
Agency v Kucharski (In re JK), 468 Mich 202, 661 NW2d 216 (2003 ). See generally
Family Independence Agency v Boursaw (in re Boursaw) , 239 Mich App 161 , 607
NW2d 408 ( 1999) (when early tem, ination was granted although there was signifi22-48
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cant progress on treatment plan. termination was reversed; overruled in part on other
grounds by fn re n·ejo. 462 Mich 341 , 612 W2d 407 (2000)). Although substantial
compliance is "evidence" of the parent's ability to care for the child properly, it is not
conclusive. Thus, if the court finds, despite the parent's substantial compliance with
the service plan, that the chi ld would be at a substantial risk of harm if returned to the
parent, the court may order the agency to file a petition seeking the termination of
parental rights. ln addition to considering the parent's conduct, the court must "consider any condition or circumstance of the child that may be evidence that a return to
the parent would cause a substantial risk of harm to the child' s life, physical health, or
mental well-being." MCL 712A. l9a(5); see generally Family Independence Agency v
Sayers-Gazella (In re Gazella), 264 Mich App 668, 675-676, 692 NW2d 708 (2005)
(parent must demonstrate that he or she has benefitted from services).
If, at the conclusion o f the PPH, the court determines that the child may not be
returned home, the court may order the agency to file a peti tion to terminate parental
rights. MCL 712A.l 9a(6); ICR 3 .976( E)(3). W ith several exceptions, if the chj!d has
been in foster care for 15 of the past 22 months, the court must order the agency to ft le
a petition to terminate parental righ ts. Id. See generally Trejo (determination regarding chi ld 's best interests is made on whole record). lf the court determines that termination will not serve the child's interests, the court may order the child 's continued
placement in foster care for a limited time or for the long tenn. MCL 712A.19a(7);
MCR 3.976(E)(4). Finally, the court may order the child placed in a guardianship.
MCL 7 l2A. I 9a(7), 722.871 et seq. (Subsidized Guardianship Assistance Act); MCR
3.976(E)( 4)( d). The procedure for appointment of a juvenile guardian is governed by
MCR 3.979. A guardian so appointed has all the rights and duties as set out in the
Estates and Protected Individuals Code. MCL 712A. l 9a(8). If the court dete1mines
that neither return to parental custody nor termination of parental rights is in the
child's best interests, it may order an "a lternative planned permanent living arrangement" (e.g., placement with a relative that is intended to be permanent, permanent
foster fami ly agreement). MCR 3.976(E)(4)(c). Whatever decision the court makes
regarding the permanency plan, it must set forth the factual basis for its decision in
the court order adopting the permanency plan. MCR 3.976(E).

XII. Termination of Parental Rights
A. In General
§22.54
Whi le a parent's rights regarding a child are extinguished on the termination of parental rights, some parental duties may survive. See, e. g., Department of
Human Servs v Beck (In re Beck). No 293138, 20 IO Mich App LEXIS 427 (Mar 4,
20 I 0) (father whose parental rights were tem1inated involuntarily still obligated to
pay child support); Evink v El'ink, 214 Mich App 172, 542 W2d 328 (1995) (father
voluntarily terminated parental rights after chi ld protective proceed ing was filed, and
child remained with mother; father was still required to pay chi ld support).
Before the cou1t may enter an order terminating a parent's rights to her or his
child, a petition must be filed with the court that requests that the parent's rights be
terminated. MCR 3.977; Department a/Human Sen,s v Holm (In re SLH), 277 Mich
App 662,747 NW2cl 547, lenve denied, 482 Mich 1007, 756 W2d 86 (2008) (where
petition contained no request lo tenninate respondent father 's parental rights, it was
22-49

§22.54

Michigan Family Law

10 Supp.

error for court to enter order tem1inating his rights). Michigan 's Juvenile Code provides 14 separate bases on which a family court may terminate a parent's rights. MCL
7 l2A. l 9b(3). Before the court may terminate a parent's rights in her or his chi ld, it
must find that one or more of those bases exist. In re Vernia, 178 Mich App 280, 443
W2d 404 ( 1989); In re Sterling, 162 Mich App 328, 412 NW2d 284 ( 1987). The
petitioner has the burden of proof for each element necessary to tenninate. In re Trejo ,
462 Mich 34 l, 6 I 2 NW2d 407 (2000). Due process requires that the standard of evidence be al least clear and convincing evidence. Santosk)1 v Kramer, 455 US 745
(1982). States are free to set a higher standard. Id. at 769-770. M ichigan has set its
standard of evidence at the clear and convincing level. MCL 712A.19b(3); Srerling.
Because the statute permits the court to terminate the rights of "a parent," the court
may tem1inate the rights of only one parent, leaving the other parent's rights intact. In
re Marin, l 98 Mich App 560, 499 NW2d 400 ( 1993 ). Due process principals are violated when the state deliberately creates circumstances that virtually assure the termination of a parent's rights. In re B, 279 Mich App 12, 756 W2d 234 (2008).
The parents of children to whom ICWA applies may be subject to tem1ination of
their parental rights on the same bases as other parents, but specific procedural
requirements must be followed. 25 USC 1901 et seq.; MCR 3.980(D), .977(G) (eff.
May l, 2010). See §22.86.
"Respondent," for purposes of the tem1ination of parental rights, means the
child's natural or adoptive mother or the child 's legal father. MCR 3.977(B); see
MCR 3.903(A)(7) (defining father). See generally Family Independence Agency v
Heier (In re CAW) , 469 Mich 192, 665 NW2d 475 (2003) (when child has legal
father, that individual is respondent, and termination of his rights is not finding that
child was born out of wedlock). A legal custodian lacks standing to oppose a termination petition. In re Foster, 226 Mich App 348, 573 NW2d 324 ( 1997).
Before the court may consider terminating a parent's parental rights, a party with
standing must first file a petition that requests that the court tenninate parental rights.
MCR 3.977(A)(2). If no petition requesting termination of parental rights has been
filed, the court has no authority to tenninate a parent's parental rights. SLH.
When a petition to term inate parental rights is filed, the court may suspend
parenting time. MCL 7 l 2A. l 9b( 4). This is a change, effective July 11, 2008, from an
automatic suspension of parenting time on the filing of a petition to terminate parental
rights. 2008 PA 199.
Res judicata does not bar subsequent petitions to terminate parental rights.
"[T]his doctrine," the court has reasoned, "cannot settle the question of a child's welfare for all time, nor prevent a court from determ ining at a subsequent time what is in
the child's best interest at that time." In re Pardee, 190 Mich App 243, 249, 475
NW2d 870 ( 1991 ). Similarly, collateral estoppel does not bar criminal prosecution in
a case in which a jury in a child protection proceeding had previously found no cause.
People II Gates, 434 Mich 146, 452 NW2d 627 (1990). This is true because a protective proceeding does not determine guilt or innocence and because ' the purposes of a
child-protective proceeding and a criminal proceeding are so fundamentally different
that application in this instance of collateral estoppel would be contrary to sound public policy." Id. at 161.
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Before the court may tenninate the rights of a parent, it must find that doing so
will serve the chi ld 's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(S). lf tbe court detennines that
termination would serve the child's best interests, the court must enter an order terminating the parent's rights. Id. ; Department of Human Servs v Hansen (In re Hansen),
285 Mich App 158, 774 NW2d 698, leave granted, 485 Mich 940, 774 NW2d 322
(2009) . In considering whether a legal basis exists to term inate parental rights, the
court may not compare a foster home to the parent's home. In re Hamlet, 225 Mich
App 505, 571 NW2d 750 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Trejo; In re
Mathers, 371 Mich 5 16, 124 NW2d 878 (1963). When determining whether there is a
legal basis to terminate a parent's rights, the court must measure the parent's capacities against statutory standards. ld However, the court may weigh the advantages of a
foster home in comparison to a parent's home when considering the child's best interests. Department of Human Servs v Foster (In re Foste,) , 285 Mich App 630, 776
NW2d 415 (2009). The court may terminate a parent's rights rather than place the
child with a relative. S1erling; In re Futch, 144 Mich App 163,375 NW2d 375 (1984).
In addition, while the DHS must meet the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when providing services to parents, the ADA is not a defense to a
tennination of parental rights proceeding. Family Independence Agency v Terry (In re
Terry), 240 Mich App 14,610 NW2d 563 (2000).
Before this chapter discusses each separate statutory basis for the termination of
parental rights, the three basic forms that a petition may take, standing (discussed
within the discussion of the three basic types of petitions), and notice requirements
must be addressed. See MCL 712A. l 9b; MCR 3.977.

B. Three Forms of Petitions
I. In General
§22.55
There are three basic fonns for termination of parental rights petitions:
(l) a petition to tem1inate parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing; (2) a supplemental petition that seeks tem1ination based on different circumstances; and (3) a
supplemental petition to terminate parental rights when the parent, after having had
services and the opportunity to rectify the conditions that led the court to assert jurisdiction, continues to be incapable of providing for the child or unwilling to do so.
Each fom1 of petition has unique procedural requirements.
2.

Petitions for Termination at the Initial Dispositional Hearing
a. In General
§22.56
"If a petition to terminate the parental rights to a child is tiled, the
court may enter an order terminating parental rights .. . at the initial cLispositional
hearing."MCL 71 2A.19b(4); see MCR 3.977(E). The court may terminate a parent's
rights even if the child has never been in foster care. In re Marin , 198 Mich App 560,
499 W2d 400 ( l 993). That is, the court need not undertake a period of temporary
wardship of the child nor ensure that efforts are made to reunify the maltreated child
with her or his parent, guardian, or legal custodian.
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b. Standing to File a Petition
§22.57
The court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child even though
the child is not in foster care. In re Marin, 198 1ich App 560, 499 NW2d 400 ( 1993).
General ly, any person who has information that a chi ld may be maltreated may file a
petition asking the court to take jurisdiction. See MCL 7 12A. I I(]). The court rule
defines the petitioner as " the person or agency who requests the court to take action"
regarding a child. MCR 3.903(A)(22); People v Gates , 434 Mich 146, 161 , 452
NW2d 627 ( 1990) (child protective "proceedings may be initiated by anyone who has
information that a child is in need of the court's protection"). In In re Huisman , 230
Mich App 3 72, 584 NW2d 349 ( I998), overruled in part on 01her grounds by In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 612 W2d 407 (2000), the court of appeals held that a parent
who has sole physical and legal custody of a child has standing to seek the termination of the parental rights of the noncustodial parent pursuant to the Juvenile Code.
This, the court reasoned, is true because MCL 712A.19b(l) provides standing to a
child's "custodian." That provision of the statute provides in part, "Except as provided in ubsection (4), if a child remains in foster care in the temporary custody of
the court ... , upon petition of the ... custodian . .. , the court shall hold a hearing to
determine if the parental rights to the child should be tem,inated." id Applying this
section, the court found that the father had standing. While the court reached the correct conclusion on the standing issLJe, it appears to have done so for the wrong reasons.
Fi rst, by its tenns, MCL 7 l2A. I 9b(I) applies " [e]xcept as provided in subsection
(4)." MCL 712A .l 9b(4), in turn, permits the court to enter an order terminating
parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing. Since any person may file a petition,
it follows that any person may seek termination at the initial dispositional hearing by
requesting it in the petition. Moreover, as the language of subsection I 9b( I) makes
clear, it addresses standing "if a child remains in foster care." MCL 7 l 2A. I 9b(l ).
Since the child in Huisman was never in foster care but, as the court pointed out, was
in the care and custody of the father, subsection 19b(1 )'s limitations on standing relating to children in foster care did not apply to the case. Although CPS was initially
involved in Huisman, it closed its case after the mother pleaded guilty to a criminal
charge relating to her abuse of the child. Huisman, 230 Mich App at 375. After CPS's
involvement ended, the father sought to terminate the mother's rights. Id. Thus, the
chi Id was not in foster care but in the care and custody of the father and, by its terms,
MCL 7 l 2A. l 9b( 1) did not apply.
c. Initial Petitions to Terminate by the Department of Human Services
§22.58
Nonmandated petitions. As discussed in §22.57, the Juvenile Code
permits any petition filed in a child protective proceeding to seek termination of
parental rights at the ini tial dispositional hearing, including one by the DHS. MCL
712A.19b(4); see, e.g., Family Independence Agency v Glass {In re AH), 245 Mich
App 77,627 W2d 33 (2001) (affirming termination at initial dispositional hearing in
face of due process and equal protection challenges). However, if the agency is considering exercising this option in a situation in which the law does not require the
agency to seek termination at the initial dispositional hearing, it "shall hold a conference among the appropriate agency personnel to agree upon the course of
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action."MCL 722.638(3). The statute is silent regarding to whom "the appropriate
agency perso,mel" is meant to refer. DHS policy, however, requires that the case conference include the CPS worker, the foster care worker, and "other staff as needed."
PSM 7 I S-3, Family Court: Petitions, Hearings and Court Orders , at S-6, available at
http://www.mfia.siale.mi .us/o lmweb/ex/PSM/7 15-3.pdf, click on CFP 715-3.
The child's L-GAL must be invited to thi s meeting but is not required to attend.
MCL 722.638(3). The statute is not clear about the nature of the L-GAL's input in the
decision, but it does state, ''If an agreement is not reached at this conference, the
department director or the director 's designee shall resolve the disagreement after
consulting the attorneys representing both the department and the child." Id. The
OHS 's policy designates tbe local office director. CFP 715-3 , at 3--4.
Mandat01J' petitions. In certain cases, tbe OHS is statutorily obligated to petition
the court for jurisdiction and to seek tenni11ation of parental rights at the initial disposition. MCL 722.638(1)- (2). ln AH, a mother whose rights were term inated because
she had previously voluntarily released her rights fo llowing the initiation of a child
protective proceedi ng challenged the statute as an unconstitutional violation of due
process and equal protection. The court rejected these arguments, finding that the statute was narrowly tailored to meet the state 's compelling interest in protecting the welfare o f tbe cb ild. Thus, the court rejected the equal protection argument. Because the
OHS still had to prove that some act or omission on the parent's part presented a risk
of harm after the petition was filed, due process was not violated. Id.
d. Procedural Requirements
§22.S9
The burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence rests with the
petitioner. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 34 1,612 W2d 407 (2000) ; In re Miller, 433 Ivlich
331, 445 NW2d 161 ( l 989). The procedural requirements for adj udicating an initial
petition to terminate parental rights are set out in MCR 3.977(E). The court must find
the following :
A petition has been filed that requests termination al the initial dispositional
hearing.
There is a preponderance of the evidence that the child comes within the jurisdictional provisions of MCL 7 I2A.2{b ). This finding may be based on either a
plea or a finding by the trier of fact Gudge or jury).
There is clear and convincing legally admissible evidence (which may be introduced at either the trial or the dispositional hearing) that one or more of the allegations in the petition are true and establish a basis for termination of parental
rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3) (excluding MCL 7 I 2A. l 9b(3)(c)) and that
termination of parental rights is in the child 's best interests. MCL 7 l2A .19b(5).

If the court makes these three findings, it may enter an order tem1inating parental
rights. In addition, if the cbild is an Indian child, as defined in MCR 3.002(5), the
court must also find that active efforts have been made to provide the parent or Indian
custodian with remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
breakup of the Ind ian fam ily, that these effo1ts have proved unsuccessful and that
there is evi dence beyond a reasonabl e doubt, including the testimony of at least one
qualified expert witness, that parental rights should be terminated because continued
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custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian will likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. MCR 3.977(G) (eff. May 1. 2010). See §22.86
for a detailed discussion concerning termination of parental rights ofan 1ndian child.
In Department of Human Servs v Cox (In re AMACJ, 269 Mich App 533, 711
NW2d 426 (2006), there was an adjudicative hearing on a petition with a request for
termination of parental rights that concluded with the trial court's rendering its written opinion and order terminating respondent's parental rights without a dispositional
hearing either immediately following the trial or by proper notice after the Lrial. Further, the trial court did not address the child's best interests in its opinion, another
deviation from the clear mandate that the child 's best interests be considered and that
such findings and conclusions be stated in the record or in writing. Because respondent's rights under MCL 7l2A.19b(5), MCR 3.973, and .977(E) were erroneously
denied, the order tenninating her parental rights was vacated and the case remanded
for a dispositional hearing.
3. Supplemental Petitions to Terminate--Different Circu mstances
§22.60
With some regularity, a child is placed into foster care due to one form
of maltreatment, and it is subsequently discovered that the child has suffered additional fonns of maltreatment. See. e.g., Family Independence Agency v Gilliam (In re
Gilliam), 241 Mich App 133, 613 W2d 748 (2000) (jurisdiction regarding father
because he did not have suitable home for children; subsequently discovered that he
had substance abuse problem); In re Snyder, 223 Mich App 85, 566 NW2d 18 (1997)
(wardship due to negl.ect and parental substance abuse; sexual abuse subsequently
disclosed). For this reason, MCL 7 l 2A.19( I) requires that if the DHS "becomes
aware of additional abuse or neglect of a child who is under the jurisdiction of the
court and if that abuse or neglect is substantiated as provided in the child protection
law, the [department] shall file a supplemental petition with the court." Thus, a foster
care worker who has reasonable suspicion that a child has suffered from more or different forms of abuse or neglect than originally known must report that additional
abuse or neglect pursuant to the CPL. MCL 722.623(1). If the report is "substantiated" by the DHS, see MCL 722.622(aa) (defining substantiated), it must file a supplemental petition, which may request the termination of parental rights.
When a supplemental petition seeks the tennination of parental rights based on a
"new or different" act of child maltreatment, that "new or different" act must be
proved by legally adm issible evidence. MCR 3.977(F); Gilliam, 24 l Mich App at
137; Snyder; see MCR 3.973(H). The court explained the rational for this distinction
in Snyde,: When the basis for termination is related to the basis for jurisdiction, the
court may consider any relevant and material evidence, because the supplemental
proofs "are presented on a background" of legally admissible evidence. No such
background exists for the new allegation. Id at 90.
The question of whether a parent alleged to have committed a "new or different"
fonn of maltreatment is entitled to a jury determination has been at issue since the
Snyder and Gilliam decisions. While no case has addressed this issue post-Snyde,; it
was addressed pre-Snyde1: In In re Miller, 178 Mich App 684 445 NW2d 168 ( I 989),
the court held that a jury is only available at the adjudicative stage of a child protective proceeding. "Juvenile proceedings are continuous in nature," the court reasoned,
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and "[o]nce a case enters the dispositional phase, any subsequently filed petition
which alleges new instances of abuse or neglect of the minor children does not create
an entirely new case which requires the ... court to redetennine jurisdiction and thus
afford the respondent the right to a jury trial." Id. at 686; see also In re Hubel, 148
Mich App 696, 384 NW2d 849 (1986).

4.

Supplemental Petitions to Terminate-Fa ilure to Rehabilitate
a. Standing
§22.61
A proper party may file a supplemental petition seeking the termination of parenta l rights based on the parent's failure to rehabilitate . MCR 3.977(H) (eff.
May l, 20 I 0).When a child has remained in foster care after a review or PPH, the
statute prov ides standing to seek action on a petition to tem1inate parental rights to a
narrowly circumscribed set of individuals:
[U]pon petition of the prosecuting attorney, whether or not the prosecuting attorney is
representing or acting as legal consultant lo the agency or any other party, or petition
of the child, guardi an, custodian, concerned person ... , agency, or children's ombudsman ... , the court shall hold a hearing lo determine if the parental rights to a child
should be terminated.

MCL 7l2A.19b(J); see In re Jagers, 224 Mich App 359, 568 NW2d 837 (1997)
(prosecutor has standing to fi le termination petition); ln re Hill, 206 Mich App 689,
522 NW2d 914 ( l 994) (when DHS files petition and is represented by someone other
than prosecutor, prosecutor lacks independent standing; prosecutor has no standing to
amend or supplement another party's petition); In re King, 186 Mich App 458, 465
W2d l (1990) (prosecutor has standing under court rnle to file petition to terminate).
A "concerned person" may file a supplemental petition to tem1inate parental
rights. MCL 712A. I 9b( 1). A concerned person is
a foster parent with whom the child is living or has lived who has specific knowledge
of behavior by the parent constituting grounds for termination ... and who has contacted the [OHS), the prosecuting attorney, the child's attorney [L-GALJ, and the
chi ld's guardian ad !item, if any, and is satisfied that none of these persons intend to
file a petition.

MCL 712A.19b(6). In addition, the office of children's ombudsman has standing to
file a supplemental petition when the child remains in foster care. MCL 712A.19b(l).

b. Procedural Requirements
§22.62
A supplemental petition to terminate parental rights may be filed at
any time following a review or PPH. MCR 3.977(H)(I) (eff. May 1, 2010). An individual with standing need not await the outcome of a PPH before filing. Id. When a
supplemental petition is filed, the court has 42 days to hold a hearing on the petition
and may continue the hearing for up to 21 days. MCR 3.977(H)(l)(b) (eff. May I,
20 I 0). Moreover, the court must issue an opinion and order ''regarding a petition for
termination of parental rights within 70 days after the commencement of the initial
hearing on the petition." MCL 712A .l 9b(l ). The court's failure to issue such an order
within this time frame wi ll not result in dismissal of the petition. Id.: see Family lnde22-55
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pendence Agency v Coleman (In re TC), 251 Mich App 368, 650

W2d 69 (2002).
The court rule is silent regarding the timing of the issuance of an order in response to
a termination petition, but the court has addressed this issue, holding that failure to
meet the time requirement in the statute does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Id.;
see also In re Kirk111ood, 187 Mich App 542, 468 W2d 280 (1991 ); In re King, 186
Mich App 458, 465 W2d I ( I 990).
When hearing a supplemental petition requesting the termination of parental
rights that is not based on a change of circumstances, the rules of evidence do not
apply, and the court may rely on any relevant and material evidence. MCR
3.977(H)(2) (eff. May 1, 20 I 0). The applicable couri rule states that the rule regarding
privileges applies "except to the extent such privileges are abrogated by MCL
722.631 ." MCR 3.977(0)(2). MCL 722.631 broadly abrogates privileges, leaving
only the attorney-client privilege fully intact and the privilege applicable to clergy
members partially intact. A statement to a member of the clergy is privileged only to
the extent that it takes place "i n a confession or similarly confidential communication." ld. Thus, if a member of the clergy receives information about a case outside of
a "confession or simi larly confidential communication," that communication is not
privileged. See In re Brock, 442 Mich IOI 119, 499 W2d 752 (1993) (privileges
broadly eliminated); Department of Soc Servs v Stricklin, 148 Mich App 659, 384
NW2d 833 ( 1986) (MCL 722.631 abrogates spousal communication privilege).

otice Requirements for Termination Petitions
§22.63
The Juvenile Code delineates the timing of and persons entitled to
notice of a petition to terminate parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(2). Notice must be in
writing and provided at least 14 days before the termination hearing. Id The persons
entitled to notice are (I) the agency (which must notify the child if the child is 11 or
older); (2) the child's foster parent or custodian; (3) the child 's parents; (4) if the child
has a guardian, the chi ld's guardian; (5) the child's Ind ian tribe 's elected leader; (6)
the child's L-GAL and each party 's attomey, including the child's, if one has been
appointed pursuant to MCL 712A. l 7d(2); (7) if the child is 11 or older, the child; and
(8) the prosecutor. [CL 7 I 2A.19b(2). lf the child is an Indian child, as defined under
MCR 3.002(5), the court must also ensure that the child's parents or Indian custodian
and the child's tribe are notified. If the parents, Indian custodian, or tribe are
unknown, notice must be sent to the Secretary of the [nterior. lCL 3.921(B)(l)(h)
(eff. May I, 2010). In addition, the court rule pennits the court to direct that any other
person be notified. MCR 3.921(8)(3).
Each person entitled to notice of a tennination proceeding must be provided that
notice pursuant to MCR 3.920 and .921(8)(3). MCR 3.977(C). Each lega l parent is a
''respondent" in a termination proceeding. MCR 3.977(B). Each must therefore be
served a summons and a copy of the tenninalion of parental rights petition. Service of
a summons on the respondent-parent s attorney is not sufficient notice to the parent.
Family Independence Age11cy v Harris (111 re Atkins) , 237 Mich App 249, 602 W2d
594 (1999). However, appearance at a hearing and participation by a party waives
defects in notice unless "objections regarding the specific defect" are made a part of
the record . MCR 3.920(G).
C.
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D. Au tho.-ity To Terminate When Paren t Has Co mplied with but ot Benefited
from Services
§22.64
Pursuant to MCL 712A . I 9a(5) and (6), if a parent has not "substantially complied" with the required case service plan by the time of the permanency
planning hearing, the law presumes that the permanency planning goal will change
from reunification to termination of parental rights, and the court may order the OHS
to file a tem1ination of parental rights petition. MCL 7 l2A.19a(6). The law does nol
e tabl ish a time frame for the OHS to comply with the court's order that it file a tennination of parental right petition. Subject to several specific exceptions, where a child
has remained in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the court must di rect
that the DHS ftle a petition seeking tem1ination of parental rights. MCL
712A. l 9a(6)(a)-{c). When the parent has failed to comply with the case service plan,
the noncompliance may form the basis for te1mination of the parent' parental rights.
Tn re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 360- 363, 612 NW2d 407 (2000). However, when the parent bas completed the prescribed case se1vice plan, the parent's compliance evidences
his or her ability to provide proper care for the child. Family Independence Agency v
Kucharski (In re JK) , 468 Mich 202, 214, 661
2d 216 (2003). But mere compliance with the .requirements of the treatment plan does not result automatically in the
return of the child. If the parent, although having complied with the case service plan,
has not derived sufficient benefit from those services to be deemed rehabilitated, the
court may tem1inate parental rights . Family Independence Agency v Sayers-Gazella
(In re Gazella), 264 Mich App 668, 675-677, 692 W2d 708 (2005). That is, mere
physical compliance with the parent-agency treatment plan is insufficient to prevent
termination. Id.
E. Bases for Terminating Pa rental Rights
1. Desertion
§22.65
The court may terminate if a parent deserts her or his child. MCL
712A.19b(3)(a). Desertion is defined at 28 days if the parent's identity is unknown
and 91 days if known. Id. When a father had not seen his child in over two years, the
court properly found abandonment. In re Maxfield, 198 Mich App 226, 497 W2d
578 ( 1997). Similarly, when a parent had "little or no contact" with her children fo r
more than a year, there was sufficient basis to terminate parental rights pursuant to
MCL 7 l 2A . l 9b(3 )(a)(ii) . 111 re Hall, 188 Mich App 217, 469 NW2d 56 ( 1991 ).
One abandonment provision coi ncides with the Safe Delivery of ewboms Law,
MCL 7 12.1 et seq., permitting the cou1i to terminate parental rights of surrendered
newborns, making them available for adoption. MCL 712A. I 9b(3)(a)(iii). There are
no reported cases interpreting this statutory provision.

2.

Parent Harmed Child or Sibling
§22.66
The court may term inate parental rights if a parent's act or omission or
a nonparent adult's act causes a child harm and the court detenn ines it is likely the
child will suffer further harm if returned to parental custody. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b).
Thus, in a case in which the prosecutor filed an original petition to terminate parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3 )(b)(i) and (ii) based on a parent's attempted murder of
a child and subsequent criminal prosecution, the trial court erred 111 fail ing to autho22-57
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rize the petition because, although the. parent was incarcerated, the child's mental
well-being remained at risk. In re SR, 229 Mich App 310, 581 W2d 291 (1998).
When a father sexually abused his children and was incarcerated for eight years based
on his guilty plea, termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) was proper. In re
Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 501 W2d 231 (1993). In contrast, when a mother took
steps to protect her children from injury by separating them from the perpetrator of
domestic violence, MCL 712A. 19b(3)(b)( ii) did not provide a proper basis for te1mination. Family Independence Agency v Sours (In re Sour~) , 459 Mich 624, 593 NW2d
520 (1999).
In In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 528 NW2d 799 ( 1995), the court addressed
the ability of the court to tenninate a parent's rights based on his physical abuse of his
live-in girlfriend's child. The court held that, because he was not a "parent" of the
mother 's child, his rights in his own child could not be tem1inated on the basis of
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b) (his rights were properly terminated based on anticipatory
neglect).

3. Expiration of 182 Days
§22.67 The Juvenile Code provides for tennination when
[t]he parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more
days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court,
by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the child's age.
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court's jurisdiction.

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c). Note that this prov ision is measured from the date on which
the court issues the initial order of disposition. The conditions on which tennination is
sought under MCL 712A.l 9b(3)(c)(i) must be those on which jurisdiction was initially taken. See Family Independence Agency v Gilliam (In re Gilliam), 241 Mich
App 133, 613 W2d 748 (2000); In re Snyder, 223 Mich App 85, 566 NW2d 18
( 1997). If new acts of abuse, neglect, or parental incapacity are alleged pursuant to
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), those new acts must be proved by clear and convincing
legally admissible evidence. Id.
For example, when a parent was incarcerated for an extended period of time and
had proposed a placement of the children with an uncle who was detem1ined not to be
in a position to take the children, it was not error to tenninate parental rights. In re
McIntyre , 192 Mich App 47, 480 NW2d 293 (1991). Similarly, when the state presented expert testimony that it would likely take three to five years beyond the statutory period for a parent to overcome her or his problems and that the children had
highly specialized needs due to severe neglect, there was no error in terminating
parental rights. In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 468 W2d 3 l5 (1991).
If the parent has corrected the conditions that led the court to assert jurisdiction
over the child, subsection (c) does not prov ide a basis to terminate parental rights.
See, e.g. , Family Independence Agency v Sours (In re Sours) , 459 Mich 624, 593
NW2d 520 (1999). If parents are not given adequate services to address the condi22-58
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tions that led to the child's wardship, termination on this ground is en-or. In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 472 NW2d 38 (1991). In addition, disregarding evidence
presented by professionals who worked with the mother over an extended period of
time and instead relying on the conflicting testimony of a single person who was a
"minimally informed source" regarding the parent-chiJd bond was error. Family Independence Agency v Kucharski (In re JK), 468 Mich 202, 66 1 NW2d 216 (2003). If the
bond between the child and the parent is an issue at termination, the trial court errs if
it fails to take into consideration the fact that parenting time is automatically suspended when a tennination petition is fi led. Id.

4. Guardian or Limited Guard ian
§22.68
The Juvenile Code provides for the tennination of parental rights when
the child has had either a guardian or a limited guardian and certain other circumstances also exist. MCL 7l2A.19b(3)(d)-(f). In such a circumstance, the guardian is
typ ically the petitioner. See MCL 7 I2A.19( I) (specifically providing guardians standing to petition for termination of parental rights). The bases for tennination cited
above track the bases for the court's assertion of jurisdiction. MCL 712A.2(b )(3)-(5).
No reported case has addressed the termination of parental rights under these provis10ns.
Pursuant to MCL 712Al9b(3)(d), the court may tenninate the rights of a parent
who has placed the child in a limited guardianship and then failed "without good
cause" to comply with the limited guardianship placement plan put in place to assist
the parent in regaining custody of the child "to the extent that the noncompliance has
resulted in a disruption of the parent-child relationsh ip." Id. The court was called on
to determine what, under this provision, constitutes good cause. Russell v Miller (In re
Utrera), 281 Mich App I, 761 NW2d 253 (2008). The court, consistent with prior rulings, held that good cause is defined as " ' a legally sufficient or substantial reason' "
Id. at 11 (quoting FG v Washtenaw County Circuit Court (In re FGJ, 264 Mich App
413, 419, 691 NW2d 465 (2004)). Thus, unless there is a "legally sufficient or substantial reason" for the parent's noncompliance with the limited guardianship placement plan, the court may tenninate parental rights if it finds that there has been a
disruption in the relationship between the child and the parent.
however, the parent's asserted good cause for noncompliance with the plan, e.g., mental illness, is the
same condition that necessitates the guardianship, it cannot constitute good cause for
noncompliance. Utrera, 281 Mich App at 23.

n:

5. Failure to Provide Proper Care or Custody
§22.69
The cornt may terminate parental rights when
[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the
child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide
proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child 's age.

MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). As the text of this provision makes clear, termination is permitted without regard to the parent's intent. See generally In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24,
444 NW2d 789 ( 1989); In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 451 NW2d 576 ( 1989) (legislature has eliminated any question about culpability for neglect). Thus, tennination
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under subsection 19b(3)(g) is proper when a parent's emotional and cognitive difficulties render the parent pemrnnently unable to effectively parent. ln re /EM., 233
Mich App 438, 592 NW2d 751 (1999). When a parent had been incarcerated for
much of his children's lives and had poor parenting skills, tennination was proper. In
re Hamlet, 225 Mich App 505, 571 NW2d 750 ( 1997), overruled in par/ on other
grounds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,612 W2d 407 (2000). When a parent's inability to recover from substance abuse re.suited in child neglect, a basis for termination
exited. Departmenl of Soc Servs v Conley (In re Conley), 216 Mich App 41, 549
NW2d 353 (1996). For other examples of the application of subsection l 9b(3)(g), see
Anderson v Schafer (In re BZ), 264 Mich App 286, 690 W2d 505 (2004) (statutory
grounds for termination met by evidence that respondent did not interact with two
sons, did not remain in contact with social worker, did not complete steps in fam ily
plan, did not maintain secure residence, and did not attend parenting sessions); in re
Huisman, 230 Mich App 372, 584 NW2d 349 (1998) (mother in prison based on
abuse of child; overruled in part on other grounds by Trejo); In re Jackson, 199 Mich
App 22, 50 I W2d 182 ( 1993) (mental illness; leaving children alone); In re Systma,
l 97 Mich App 453, 495 W2d 804 ( 1992) (little contact with child· long criminal
history; substance abuse); In re King, l 86 Mich App 458, 465 NW2d I (I 990)
(repeated evictions) . However, when the parent had "fulfilled every requirement of
the parent-agency agreement'' and that "compliance negated any statutory basis for
termination," the court erred in tenninating parental rights under subsection
l 9b(3)(g). Family Independence Agency v Kucharski (In re JK), 468 Mich 202, 214,
661 NW2d 216 (2003).
6. Parental Incarceration
§22.70
The court may terminate the parental rights of a parent who is incarcerated for a period that will result in the child being deprived of a proper home for
two years . MCL 712A. l 9b(3)(h). Under this provision, the court must only consider
future incarceration of the parent and not whether past incarceration together witl1
future incarceration will meet the two-year time requirement. in re Per1y, 193 Mich
App 648, 484 NW2d 768 (1992); in re Neal, 163 Mich App 522, 414 NW2d 916
(1987). When a parent was sentenced to seven to twenty years, he "would not likely
be able to provide his children with a suitable home for at least two years."/11 re
Ovalle, 140 Mich App 79, 84, 363 NW2d 731 (1985).
7. Termination Based on a Prior Termination
§22.71
The statute has three separate provisions for the tennination of a parent's rights when the parent has previously lost a child to termination. MCL
7 I2A.l 9b(3 )(i), (/), (m). Michigan 's appellate courts have upheld the court's authority
to take protective action regarding children, including the termination of a parent's
rights based on a prior tem1ination in the face of equal protection and due process
challenges. Family Independence Agency v Glass (In re AH), 245 Mich App 77, 627
NW2d 33 (2001) (note that whi le facts of thi s case involved prior termination and
mother challenged mandatory petition provisions of MCL 722.638, court actually terminated based on MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g)). The court has also applied subsection 19b(3)(i) to terminate the parental rights of a parent in his own child when he
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had previously abused his unmarried live-in girlfriend's child, had been unsuccessful
in rehabilitating himself after services were offered, and the mother's rights in that
child were tem1inated. in re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 528 NW2d 799 (1995) .

8. Likelihood of Future Harm
§22.72
When there is clear and convincing ev idence of possible future harm
to the child if returned to parental custody, the law provides a basis for tem,ination.
MCL 712A.19b(3)U). However, if the prediction of future hann is "essentially conjecture," the court is w ithout a basis to terminate a parent's rights. Family Independence Agency v Boursm v (In re Boursaw) , 239 Mich App 161,607 NW2d 408 (1999)
(citing Family Independence Agency v Sours (ln re Sours), 459 Mich 624, 593 W2d
520 (I 999); overruled in part on other grounds by in re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 612
W2d 407 (2000)).
9. Serious Abuse or eglect
§22.73
The Juvenile Code pennits tennination when a child or her or his sibling has suffered from one of several specific forms of serious abuse or neglect such
as criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, battering, or li fe-threatening injuries. MCL 712A.19b(3)(k). o published appellate opinions have addressed this provision.
10. Conviction of Specified Crimes
§22.74
The law provides for the termination of rights when a parent has been
convicted of certain specifically delineated criminal offenses ifcontinuing the parentchild relationship would li kely harm the chi ld. These crimes include murder, criminal
sexual conduct, or repeated vio lent crimes. MCL 7 l 2A.19b(3)(n). The conviction
does not need to result from a crime against the parent's child or any other child. The
court need on ly find that there is a conviction coupled w ith a find ing that a continued
rela tionship between parent and ch ild would be harmful. No published appellate decision addresses termi nation under thj s subsection .
[n In re Andino, 163 M ich App 764, 4 15 W2d 306 (1987), the court held that a
parent's no contest pl ea to criminal sexual conduct charges involving his children
could be admitted in the dispositional phase o f a child protective proceeding. lt is not
clear whether a no contest plea would constitute a "conviction" for purposes of this
provision.
F.

Best Interests Phase
§22.75
lfthe fam ily court determines that there is a basis to terminate parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3), the court must then consider what course of action
will serve the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b{5). Jfthe court determines
that termination of parental rights will serve the child s best interests, it "shall order
termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the
child with the parent not be made.' Id. Thus, if the trial cou1t finds that there is a legal
basis to terminate parental rights and that doing so will serve the child's best interests,
then " termination is mandatory and not pennissive ." Department of Human Servs v
Hansen (In re Hansen), 285 Mich App I 58, 774 NW2d 698, leave grantee/, 485 Mich
22-6 1
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940, 774 NW2d 322 (2009). The child's best interests may be determined from the
entire record of the case. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 612 NW2d 407 (2000). However,
the trial court may not conduct an unrecorded in camera interview of the minor children for purposes of determ ining the children's best interests. Doing so results i11 a
violation of the parents' due process rights. Department of Human Servs v Compton
(In re HRC), 286 Mich App 444, _
W2d _ (2009). While the court cannot consider the advantages of a foster home in detennining whether a legal basis exists to
terminate parental rights, In re Mathers , 371 fich 5 I 6, 124 NWd 878 ( 1963), the
court may consider the advantages of a foster home when addressing the child's best
interests. Department of Human Servs v Foster (In re Foster), 285 Mich App 630, 776
W2d 415 (2009).
G

Posttermination Reviews
§22.76
If the court terminates parental rights, the court must hold a posttermination review hearing every 91 days for the first year after the order terminating
parental rights. MCR 3.978(A); MCL 712A. 19c. If the child remains in care beyond
one year after the order tem1inating parental rights, the court must hold a posttennination review hearing at least every 182 days. Id. If the child is placed in another
planned pennanent living arrangement, is the subject of a pennanent foster family
agreement, or is placed in the home of a relative and that placement is intended to be
penuanent, the court must hold a posttennination review hearing every 182 days for
as long as the child remains a ward of the court. MCL 712A.19(4); MCR3.978(A). A
posttennination review hearing may be held earlier than required by the statute or
court rule. MCL 712A. l 9c. The purpose of a posttermination review is for the court
to review the child's placement and progress toward adoption or other permanency
goal, MCR 3.978(A), and the appropriateness of the permanency goal and whether
reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency goal have been made. MCL 712A. 19c.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court "may enter such orders as it considers necessary in the best interests of the child." MCR 3.978(C). The court may choose to
appoint a juvenile guardian as established in MCL 712A. 19c and MCR 3.979.

XIll. Reviews, Rehearing, and Appeals
A. Reviews of Referee Recommendations
§22.77
Referees are authorized to preside over many of the hearings in child
protective proceedings. See MCR 3.91 1- .912. However, they may make only recommendations that must be reviewed and approved by a j udge before becoming an order
of the court. Family Independence Agency v AME (in re AA1B), 248 Mich App 144,
640 NW2d 262 (200 I). The court rules establish the procedural requirements for the
review of referee recommendations. MCR 3.991. Once a recommendation has been
issued, a party has seven days to file a written request for a judge to review it. MCR
3.99l(B). The j udge need not wait the seven days and may review the recommendation at any time. MCR 3.991 (A)(3). Once lhe judge has reviewed the recommendation and signed the order, the parties lose the opportunity to request a review and must
seek a rehearing under MCR 3.992. MCR 3.99l(A)(4). The operation of this rule is
particularly important at the preliminary stage of the proceeding. For example, if the
referee recommends that the child be removed from the parent's custody, this is not an
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order of the court until the judge reviews the recommendation and enters an order.
Consequently, many courts have sped up the review process, eliminating, in some situations, effective review of referee recommendations.
A request for review must be in writing and be served on the parties. MCR
3.99J(B ). A written response to a request for review may be filed. MCR 3.99l(C).
However, the judge need not schedule a hearing on a request for review. MCR
3.99I (D); Family Independence Agency v Harris (In re Atkins), 237 Mich App 249,
602 NW2d 594 ( 1999). Whether or not the court holds a hearing on the request, the
judge must consider tbe request within 21 days unless good cause is shown requiring
a longer period. MCR 3.99 I (D). In making a decision, the judge must adopt the referees recommendation unless either (1) the judge would have reached a different
result or (2) the referee committed legal error that is likely to have affected the outcome or is not otherwise ham1less. MCR 3.991(E). The judge has broad discretion in
handling a review and may adopt the recommendation as written, mod ify it as the
judge sees fit, or reject the recommendation entirely. M.CR 3.91 l(F). For example,
when the referee properly admitted a child's hearsay statement, the judge properly
concluded on review that there was no error of law. In re Brimer, 191 Mich App 40 l,
478 NW2d 689 ( 1991 ).
B. Rehearing
§22.78
A party may seek a rehearing by filing a written motion within 21 days
after the court issues its order. MCR 3.992(A). The court has discretion to permit an
untimely request if there is good cause for doing so. Id. The motion must state the
basis on which rehearing is requested. id. To warrant consideration, the motion must
present information not previously presented or information that was presented but
not considered by the court. id. Each party must receive notice of a rehearing pursuant
to MCR 3.920. MCR 3.992(B). A party may file a response within seven days of the
motion; the response must be in wiiting and served on all parties. MCR 3.992(C). The
court need not hold a hearing on the motion; if it does, the rules relating to a dispositional hearing apply. MCR J.992(E). The judge may affirm modify, or vacate the
prior decision . MCR 3.992(D). The court may also stay the application of an order
pending rehearing. MCR 3.992(F). For a discussion of the distinction between a
judge' reviev,' of a recommendation and a rehearing, see Family Independence
Agency v A'/v.fB (In re AMB) 248 Mich App 144, 219- 220, 640 W2d 262 (200 I).
C. Appeals
§22.79
A party may appeal the following orders to the court of appeals as of
right: (I) a dispositional order placing a child under the supervision of the court or
removing the child from her or his home, (2) an order tenninating parental rights, (3)
an order required by law to be appealed to the court of appeals, and (4) any final
order. M.CR 3.993(A). Any other order may be appealed by leave of the court of
appeals. MCR 3.993(B). The rules in MCR 7.101 et seq. apply to child protective proceeding appeals. M.CR 3.993(C)( l ). While the court of appeals may grant a late
request to appeal, no appeal may be granted if it is requested more than 63 days after
entry of the order of tennination or 63 days after an order denying reconsideration of
an order tenninating parental rights. MCR 3.993(C)(2). But see MCR 7.205(F)(5)
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(which seems lo permit the court to grant leave for up to one year under certain narrow circumstances). A party may seek leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court
within 21 days after a decision in the court of appeals. MCR 7 .302(C)(2). A delayed
application for leave to appeal to the supreme court may be filed within 56 days of the
court of appeals decision. MCR 7.302(C)(3).
If a party objects to the court decision asserting temporary jurisdiction over a
child, thal party must appeal the order directly and may not wait until after a supplemental petition seeking tennination of parental rights has been granted to appeal. In re
Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, SOS NW2d 834 ( 1993 ). To do so constitutes a collateral
attack. Id. It is not, however, a collateral attack to appeal the court's assertion of jurisdiction under MCL 7 l 2A.2(b) after the court has ordered the termination of parental
rights in response to an ini tial petition that requests termination. Department of
Hum an Servs v Holm (In re SLH), 277 Mich App 662, 747 NW2d 547, leave denied,
482 Mich 1007, 756 W2d 86 (2008). Collateral estoppel as articulated in Hatcher
arises only when there is a written order from which to appeal. In re Bechard, 211
Mich App 155,535 NW2d 220 ( ! 995). When a child has been returned to the parent's
custody and is subsequently removed by court order, the order of removal may be
appealed as of right rather than by leave of the court. Family Independence Agency v
Pantaleon (ln re EP) , 234 Mich App 582. 59· W2d 167 ( 1999), overruled in part
on other grounds by in re Trejo, 462 Mich 34 1, 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
A parent whose rights have been terminated has a right to appeal that decision .
Family Independence Agency v Kucharski (In re JK), 468 Mich 202,661
lv'2d 216
(2003). Thus, while an appeal is pending in a cennination of parental rights case, the
trial court has no authority to proceed with the child's adoption. Jc/.

XIV. Indian Child Welfare Act
A. In General
§22.80 The application of ICWA to a chil d protective proceeding is complex,
and space limitations do not pe1mit a comprehensive di cussion.
The purpose of ICWA is "to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indi an children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes." 25 USC 1902. ICWA applies only to children who are members of
federally recognized tribes. Family Independence Agency v Fried (In re Fried), 266
Mich App 535, 702 W2d 192 (2005). ln the applying ICWA. Michigan court have
rejected the " existing Indian fami ly' exception, which holds that, if the child has not
been raised in a fam ily that has exposed the child to Indian culture, lCWA does not
apply. In re Ellioll, 2 18 Mich App 196, 554 NW2d 32 ( 1996). However, Michigan
courts have held that ICWA does not apply to an "Indian child" when the petitioner
seeks to terminate the parental righ ts of the child's non-Indian parent and the action
will not break up an Indian family. Fa111ily Independence Agency v Dougherty (In re
Dougherty), 236 Mich App 240, 599 NW2d 772 (1999). While ICWA applies to relatively few child protection cases, when the application of the stah1te is raised, it is
critical that its provisions be closely adhered to. See, e.g. , Mississippi Band of Chocta w Indians v Holyfield, 490 US 30 (1989) (adoption oflndian children set aside thJee
years after granted when tribe was not properly notified of proceedings).
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B.

Definitions
§22.8 1
ICWA includes numerous tem1s of art that are critical to its application. See 25 USC 1903. First, it defines child custody proceeding to include the placement ofa child in foster care (which is defined 10 include placement in a guardianship
if the parent may not regain custody of the child on demand), the termination of
parental rights, preadoptive placement, and adoptive placement. 25 USC 1903(1).
Parent means a child's biological parent or an Indian person who has lawfully
adopted an Indian child (adoption may be pursuant to tribal law or tribal custom). 25
USC 1903(9). The term Indian child refers to a child who is unmarried, under 18
yea rs of age, and either a member of an Indian tri be or eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and the biological child of a member of a tribe. 25 USC 1903( 4). Effective May 1, 20 I 0, the Michigan Court Rules adopt these defin itions at [CR 3.002
and incorporate several of the requirements of the ICWA into the court rules dealing
with adoption,juvenile delinquency, child protective, and guardianship proceedings.
Tribes have the exclusive right to determine their membership. In re Shawboose,
175 M ich App 637, 438 NW2d 272 ( 1989). However, ICWA does not apply to termination cases when the minor child is claimed to be an Indian chi ld from an Indian
tribe that is not recognized as eligible for services provided to Indians by the Secretary of the Interior. Family Independence Agency v Fried (In re Fried), 266 Mich App
535, 702 NW2d 192 (2005)(Lost Cherokee 1ation is not recognized by federal government and, therefore, does not fall within provisions of ICWA) . If the court has no
reason to believe the child is an "Indian child' and the chil d does not become a tribe
member until after termination of parental rights, it is not an abuse of discretion to
deny rehearing. In re Johanson, 156 Mich App 608, 402 W2d l 3 (1987).
C.

Procedural Protections fo r Indian Tribes and Families
In General
§22.82
ICWA has numerous procedural protections aimed at protecting the
interests of Indian tribes and parents. At every stage of a proceeding, the procedural
protections afforded to Indian children, families, and tribes are more exacting than
those that apply lo other chi ld protection cases. 25 USC 192 1. This disparate treatment does not offend equal protection. In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 451 NW2d 5 76
(1990).

1.

2. Placement
§22.83
When considering placement, the domicile of a chi ld who is the subject of a protective proceeding to which ICWA applies is critical. When the child
re ide · on or is domiciled on a re ervation, the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction.
25 USC 1911 ; see also Misslvsippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 490 US 30
(1989) (Indian child may be domiciled on reservation although child had never in fact
been on reservation). If such a child is off the reservation, the state court may take
steps to protect the child in an emergency. 25 USC 1922; MCR 3.963 (eff. May I,
201 0). When a child resides or is domiciled off the reservation, placement of the child
is governed by 25 USC J912( e), which provides that such a child may not be placed
in to foster care unless the court determines, based on clear and convincing evidence,
including expert testimony, that continuing the child's custody with her or his Indi an
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custodian "is likely to result in se1ious emotional or physical damage to the child." Id.
Moreover, before a placement may be made, the court must find that there have been
"active efforts" made to prevent the breakup of the family. 25 USC l 912(d). If an
lndian child is taken as a result of an emergency, a removal hearing must be completed within 14 days after the removal from a parent or Indian custodian unless the
parent or custodian requests an additional 20 days for the hearing. MCR 3.967(A)
( eff. May I, 20 I 0). Temporary emergency custody may not be continued for more
than 45 days " [a]bsent extraordinary circumstances that make additional delay
unavoidable." Id.
When a child is placed into foster care, ICWA establishes a placement preference
that must be followed:
(i) a member of the child 's extended family ;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian chi ld 's tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian

licensing authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an lndian tribe or operated by an
Indian o rganization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.

25 USC 1915(6). The Michigan Court Rules mirror the ICWA's placement priorities.
MCR 3.965(B)( l 2)(b) (eff. May I , 2010)
The ICWA also establishes a placement preference for adoptions involving an Indian
child. See 25 USC 19l5(a).

otice
ICWA s notice requirements are unique in that, in addition to the parent (or "Jndian custodian"), the child's tribe or the Secretary of the Interior must also
be notified. 25 USC 1912(a). The duty to provide notice arises when there is any indication that a child may be an Indian chiJd and rests with the petitioner. In re !EM., 233
Mich App 438, 599 NW2d 772 (1999). When there is any indication of a specific
tribal affi liation, that tribe must be notified. Family Independence Agency v Hosler
(In re NEGP) , 245 Mich App 126, 626 NW2d 921 (2001). If tribal affiliation is uncertain, both the possible tribes and the secretary should be notified. Id. If no specific
tribe is named, notice should be provided to the secretary. otice to the secretary or
the tribe must be in writing and sent registered mail return receipt requested and
include a copy of the petition, a summons, and a statement that the proceedings may
result in the termination of parental rights. 25 USC 1912(a). The Michigan Court
Rules require lhe uelivt:ry ur nuli1.:t: in all adoption, juvenile delinquency, child protective, and guardianship proceedings involving an Indian child. MCR 3.802(A)(3)
(eff. May I , 2010), .920(C) (eff. May 1, 2010), 5.109 (eff. May I , 2010). Best practice
suggests that copies of all documents sent to the tribe or the secretary be filed with the
court. Similarly, copies of any response from the tribe or the secretary should be filed
with the court. Once notice is completed, the court should make findings on the
record regarding (1) whether lCWA's notice requirements have been met, (2) whether
the tribe has detennined that the child is a member, and (3) whether ICWA's provisions apply to the state court proceeding. See generally Family Independence Agency
v Conselyea (In re TM), 245 Mich App 181 , 628 W2d 570 (2001 ). Substantial compliance with ICWA's notice requirements is sufficient to meet ICWA's burdens. id
3.
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(notice was not sent registered mail return receipt requested, but tribe responded and
declined to intervene). When ICWA's notice requirements have been complied with
and the tribes do not respond, the burden shifts to the parents to prove that ICWA
applies. Id.
4. The Tribe's Right to Transfer or Intervene
§22.85
If a child is a member of a tribe, the tribe has the right to remove the
case from the state court to the tribal court on the motion of either the Indian custodian or the tribe itself, unless a parent of the child objects. 25 USC 191 l(b); see also
MCR 3.807(B)(2)(a) (eff. May 1, 2010), .905(C){ l ) (eff. May 1, 2010);
5.402(E)(3 )(a) (eff. May I, 2010). Absent good cause, the state comt must transfer the
case. Id. "A perceived inadequacy of the tribal court or tribal services does not constitute good cause to refuse to transfer a case." MCR 3.807(B){2)(a) (eff. May l , 20 I 0),
.905(C)(l) (eff. May 1, 2010); S.402(E){3){a) (eff. May I, 2010). Similarly, the tribe
may intervene into the state court proceeding and may exercise that right at any point
in the proceeding. 25 USC 191 1(c).
5. Termination of Parental Rights
§22.86
The court may terminate the parental rights of an "Indian child" only
on a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that "continued custody of the child by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child."25 USC l912(f); MCR 3.977(G)(2) (eff. May 1, 2010). Such a detennination must be supported by "qualified expert witnesses." Id. The court is required to
make this finding in addition to the findings that are necessary under MCR 3.977 to
terminate any parent's parental rights. For example, the court properly tenn inated
parental rights when the petitioner presented evidence including the testimony of a
qualified expert that the mother suffered from long-tem1 mental illness and was not
stable and that numerous services were offered. In re Kreft, 148 Mich App 682, 348
W2d 843 ( 1986).
In addition to its finding on the issue that continued custody will result i.n serious damage to the child, the court must also make spec ific findings that the department made "active efforts" to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts were unsuccessful.
25 USC l 9 12(d); MCR 3.977(G)(eff. May l , 2010). The standard of proof to apply to
whether active efforts were undertaken is proof by clear and convincing evidence.
Department of Human Servs v Finfrock (In re Roe), 281 Mich App 88, 97, 10 1, 764
NW2d 789 (2008). Further, fom1al or infomrnl services provided prior to the current
proceedings may meet the active efforts requirement of the ICWA. Where OHS and
its contract agents provided ''active efforts" regarding one child, those services did
not succeed in rehabilitating the parent, and then another child became the focus of
the DHS 's concern, the agency fulfilled the "active efforts" requjrement for the second chi ld by providing "a thorough, contemporaneous assessment of the services provided to the parent in the past and the parent's response to those services before
seeking to tenninate parental rights without having offered additional services."
Department of Human Servs v Lee (In re JL), 483 Mich 300, 305, 770 NW2d 853
(2009).
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